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Abstract
Democratic and authoritarian regimes govern using very different methods. While the 
rulers of the various regimes often orate similar political philosophies, their governing 
tactics reveal startlingly different methods of inclusion, persuasion and/or coercion of their 
populations. In policy formulation, in particular, governors attempt to manage using means 
which exemplify their willingness to include or specifically exclude the masses and which 
express their commitment to the contending philosophies.
In this essay, the application of these political philosophies through government and 
societal institutions in Azerbaijan will be reviewed to determine if Azerbaijan is really 
embarking on a democratic venture or if it is continuing past practices of authoritarianism 
which have been learned over more than 150 years of imperial and Soviet rule. After the 
theoretical framework for democracy is grounded, the implementation of democratic 
principles in the newly-independent Azerbaijan will be discussed in the areas of socio­
political, foreign and economic policy.
It is the attempt of this thesis to show that while authoritarian philosophies can be used 
to manage the politico- legal institutions and population in Azerbaijan, the long-term 
development and "health" of Azerbaijan and its people will rely on the implementation of 
democratic institutions and transparent decision-making.
Chapter I: Introduction
Azerbaijan is located at the geopolitical crossroads of the world. It is a nation 
striving to combine Occidental modernism with Oriental traditionalism to forge a hybrid 
state in which it can utilize its past experiences in order to develop a sound basis for 
political and economic growth in the future. The Azerbaijani nation of today has 
emerged from subjugation to governments of massive foreign empires which held tight 
reins in order to limit the freedoms of their subjects. Azerbaijan has evolved 
incorporating many of the most forceful influences of these empires' characteristics into 
its cultural and social frameworks. At the same time, the nation is trying to shake off 
the antediluvian political structures handed down by these empires and to develop a 
governmental system that will best encourage and assist the creation of a state that will 
inspire the methods to achieve the aspirations of an independent nation.
These aspirations include a greater impact of individual choice and preference on 
the activities of politicians by developing mechanisms which will increase participation 
by the public in political decision-making and higher levels of responsiveness and 
representativeness by the political leaders. The goals also include an end to the external 
conflicts and threats and strong cultural, security and economic ties with foreign 
nations. Another goal encourages improvement in the economic indicators of the 
nation's economy which reflects higher standards of living, the freedom to choose 
personal investments and enterprises which will increase efficiency and welfare. These 
individual initiatives will assist Azerbaijan in acquiring greater national capital 
accumulation and this capital leverage will allow an effort to emerge by the state to 
provide services which will guarantee the health, sustainability and vitality of the nation 
and its populace.
Because of the conflicting elements in Azerbaijan's history, which through time 
have been deeply rooted into the social outlook, Azerbaijan may suffer from unsteady 
progress and unplanned setbacks in its attempt to institute forms and structures suitable 
to advance national and individual goals. Because of its repeated subjugation to 
authoritarian management of all the republic's affairs, public and private, Azerbaijan is 
facing difficulties in establishing a platform to provide the formula which would best 
promote the possibilities of achieving the goals mentioned above. An open system 
based on democratic principles will benefit Azerbaijan in reconstructing the nation 
because democracy encourages the development of the very goals the nation is 
attempting to achieve.
The purpose of this paper is to assert that an ideal working democracy will best 
support a new Azerbaijan. There are several reasons to assert this claim. For one, 
"ideal" refers to two aspects of democracy. Democracy as an ideal suggests that 
democracy is the best governmental system to have been conceived in the world thus 
far. Democracy has shown to be more resilient than other forms of government and has 
several self-saving mechanisms. Until a better system emerges, democracy will 
continue to be perceived as the normative standard. This is the first contention of this 
paper. Secondly, an "ideal democracy" is one in which cooperation and participation 
are used to everyone's best benefit. In a democracy which functions ideally, there also 
exists a symmetry between the leaders and the followers within the system. Unlike 
socialism, where no leaders are meant to exist, or authoritarianism, in which only one or 
a few persons manage the affairs of the entire state and the public is left without a role 
in society, democracy attempts to create a holistic balance. The reciprocity in the 
relationship of leaders to followers is essential to a stable democracy. This should be 
elaborated. Several other aspects of an "ideal" democracy should also be discussed here 
in greater detail.
The relationship of the leaders and followers in a democracy can be elaborated 
according to the notion of sovereignty. Sovereignty is accepted because it represents the 
will of the people. In a democratic system, the citizens of a state elect and support the 
ways in which the state exercises its sovereignty and arrives at decisions. To take the 
notion of sovereignty one step further, one of the basic understandings in a democratic 
regime follows the logic that if the rulers of the state no longer represent the will of the 
people in exercising sovereignty over them, the people can always change the rulers, 
and, hence, the methods of rule. This principle takes for granted that the opportunity for 
making the change will be conducted according to commonly accepted rules, using the 
institutions established for this purpose, and will occur within a framework that 
promotes the peaceful transfer of power. In a properly functioning democracy, the 
leader who is elected and given the power to govern has arisen to his or her position 
using the same institutional methods as retired the previous governors.
In this situation, the governors of a democratic nation consent to rule according to 
institutional standards and the populace consents to be ruled by agreements it has 
created and/or endorsed. Furthermore, the agreement stipulates that those candidates 
vying for power and not gaining it can continue to compete in later contests.
Another element which underlines all democratic foundations rests on the 
presumption that the constitution is the ultimate body of laws to be respected. 
Observing the laws and principles that ground the society in them is the basis of a 
constitutional arrangement. As former Sorbonne University professor Raymond Aron 
describes in his book. Democracy and Totalitarianism, a constitutional arrangement 
validates a working government. The constitution fixes precise rules in which the 
competition for the exercise of power is organized. In a constitutional system, law­
making requires certain measures and mechanisms for intervention as defined by the
constitution. The constitution is nonpartisan and not judicial. It allows that those who 
require the redress of justice have the opportunity to get it, that those who are injured by 
law-making can appeal to a court in which the constitutionality of the law is considered 
and that bodies which can deal with the problems between the state and the individual 
exist (1). In other words, "individual rights deserve explicit protection". Constitutional 
government insists that a system of checks and balances exist so as to limit authority 
and to legalize due process and equality in the execution of rules.
A political democracy exists when certain other criteria are met. The criteria 
enumerated by preeminent democratic theoretician Robert A. Dahl seems to be the most 
oft quoted and comprehensive list to date in describing the elements of a political 
democracy. The characteristics of a political democracy include the freedom to form 
and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public 
office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, access to 
alternative forms of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making 
government policies depend on voting and other expressions of preference (2).
Under these conditions, organizations with conflicting interests are recognized as 
permanent features of the democratic system, they obey certain rules, specifically avoid 
certain strategies for achieving their goals (this, author Guillermo O'Donnell says, 
creates stability within a democratic regime), and when these organizations are defeated, 
they still breathe to argue their positions again another day.
Other elements may be added and could be considered essential to the foundations of 
an ideal democracy. A free press, the right for opposition organizations to voice their 
dissatisfaction and the ability of special interest groups to lobby their causes are also 
credited as fundamental elements of a political democracy. Other characteristics of
political democracy include the absence of discrimination based on sex, race, religion, 
income, property, or political party, bi a political democracy, as embodied in the 
constitution, majority rule does not limit minority rights to due process under the law 
and minorities can seek redress in the legal system.
Some other considerations such as voting procedures designed to eliminate 
grievances, electoral representation explicitly providing a mandate for the 
representatives or majoritarianism being the summary form by which interests prevail 
have also been mentioned as criteria for the establishment of political democracy. These 
variations express the procedural choices by which a populace decides to be ruled, and 
may vary from democracy to democracy without impinging on the central tenets of the 
ideal.
Party politics has become the main form of representation in modem democracies. 
Any number of parties may exist in a nation and be strong and effective at the same 
time. Democratic fionctioning is based on a multiple party foundation in which groups 
organize in order to be politically active and foster the nature of pluralism.
Raymond Aron came up with a definition of parties and their place in society. He 
says parties are "voluntary groups, some more organized and some less, which claim in 
the name of a certain idea of the common interest and of society to assume, alone or in 
coalition, the functions of government (3)". Parties are groups which serve the 
functions of government and try to earn the maximum number of members in 
congressional structures. The voluntary nature of the party is meant to establish the 
constitutional rights of individuals.
Democratic government is enacted through the periodic vote of individuals who 
associate their beliefs with the representatives they entrust to make decisions for them. 
One catchy phrase denotes party associations as providing "consumer sovereignty", in 
other words, individuals can shop around for the representatives that best concur with 
their interests and who can best fulfill and meet an individual's goals. When the 
representative is found, he or she is given the express support of the voter to be the 
sovereign leader for as long as the representative continues to maintain the voter's 
confidence.
Critics of electoral parties complain that parties cause pigeon-holing of issues, 
placing them in a single-answer paralysis and giving the voter the choice of all or none, 
partisanship is said to reduce the quality of political debate and promotes an adversarial 
element to this debate. These criticisms may be accurate, but the benefit of the party 
system is to allow opposition to be heard within the governmental hierarchy and to 
establish an organization which can articulate the needs and goals of a distinct and 
explicit segment of society. A final note on party formation reveals that it makes the 
manner of voting easier and more efficient, if not more representative of less vocal or 
less organized members of society.
Voting, then, also has become one of the core themes which defines democratic 
nations. Voting systems have been widely debated to find the best method for allowing 
all opinions to be represented in government (4). An overall consensus exists that voting 
systems should be based on the idea of "one person, one vote". This system is seen as 
protecting all citizens as they can remove a leader who does not meet democratic 
expectations. As rarely an absolute majority is ever reached in a pluralistic society, 
equally weighted voting allows every view an expression in official circles.
With these democratic ideals in mind, the objective of this thesis is to illuminate the 
mechanisms, reasons and goals behind the move toward democracy in Azerbaijan. 
Furthermore, this thesis will relate these preferences and actions in relationship to 
Azerbaijan's institutional structures, foreign and economic policy options. The citizens 
of Azerbaijan have expressed their desire to move the government toward a democratic 
formula. This requires an intense effort by the administration. The final purpose of this 
thesis will be to discuss how the presidents of this emerging nation have responded to 
the calls for democracy, what kind of restrictions, both personal and political, they are 
facing, and to what degree the presidents have succeeded in contributing to the 
establishment of a democratic nation. The thesis reviews chronologically and 
systematically the activities of these presidents and the effect of their activities on the 
public and the democratic process.
It is unrealistic to hope for an "ideal" democracy in Azerbaijan after only two and a 
half years of independence. It is also doubtful that Azerbaijan will ever become a 
paradigm for democracy. No pure democracy exists so far in this world and there are 
some aspects of an ideal democracy which appear to be unworkable. But the statement 
of the desire by the public to try to achieve a stable democracy, the rejection of 
Azerbaijan's authoritarian past and the need to establish a sound government in 
Azerbaijan make the search for democracy worthwhile and makes the study of 
democracy in this republic a concrete and meaningful task.
The methods of the Azerbaijani people and administration will be reviewed and 
critiqued in this thesis to weigh the commitment to democracy and analyze the means 
employed to reach a stated but unclear end. The following chapter of this essay will 
evaluate the historical trends and the goals aimed at for instituting democracy and 
creating the structures which allow its smooth operation. The third chapter will review
foreign policy decisions in the light of democratically-based diplomacy and will critique 
the activities of presidents as they try to attract interest and favors from members of the 
international community for immediate benefit. In the fourth chapter, the economic 
policies which have been adopted to lead Azerbaijan to greater prosperity and agreeable 
standards of living will be reviewed. Policy options will be related to democratic 
prescriptions for economic recovery. Overall, the balance between goal acquisition and 
adherence to democratic principles will be compared and rated.
Before discussing the current trends in Azerbaijan, it is necessary to rediscover 
Azerbaijani history. A clear recollection of the past will allow an understanding of the 
region and the people to unfold so that recent events can be better evaluated to measure 
the success of the latest efforts toward reform. It will also allow a greater 
comprehension of the social and economic barriers posing an obstacle to democratic 
initiative and the psychological factors which allow regressions away from democracy. 
The past is the place to begin in order to understand the journey upon which the nation 
is embarking.
Chapter H- Democracy and Socio-Political Institutions in Azerbaijan
Historical Background of Transcaucasia
The Azerbaijani people are a curious mixture of predominantly Persian and Turkish 
descendency. The indigenous population which had settled in the Caucasus mountains 
had been subjects of most notably the Arabic Shirvanshah, Turkish Seljuk and Safavid 
dynasties. As inheritances from these dynasties, the Azerbaijani people adopted Shia 
Islam as their religion and Turkish as their literary language. The Azerbaijani people 
showed remarkable talents in architecture, poetry and science. The people were very 
adept at trading and the area produced marvelous raw silk. The region was also rich in 
iron ore, copper, marble and oil.
In the sixteenth century, as other influences in the region retreated and as the 
Safavid dynasty became increasingly powerful, the Ottoman Turks attempted to gain 
control over the region. The Ottoman-Iranian wars of the 16th and 17th centuries led to 
the occupation of the Caucasus by the Ottomans from 1578 to 1603. After continuous 
warfare, the region then passed back to the Safavid state and wars lasted until 1639 after 
which the Ottomans were soon joined by the Russian Empire for control over the 
Caucasus (1). Peter the Great took control of the Caspian coast for the first two decades 
of the 18th century, but the lands returned to the control of the Safavids in the 1730s. 
The Safavid dynasty was in decline by the mid 18th-century, however, and the local 
khanates assumed partial sovereignty under the feudal control of the Iranian shahs 
which had replaced the deceased Safavid lineage in 1747.
Again in a bid to gain greater territories for the Russian empire, the Russians fought 
for the Caspian coast and the Caucasus. The Christian Georgian population which
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inliabited the eastern and northern portions of the Caucasus appealed to Catherine the 
Great for protection and voluntarily joined Russia in 1801. Several of the khanates in 
Eastern Caucasia also requested Russian protection from the Iranian shahs and the 
Ottoman Sultans.
In the Russo-Iranian War of 1804-1813, Russia gained control of many of the 
khanates of Northern Azerbaijan, East Georgia and Daghestan in the Treaty of Gülistan. 
Again in 1826, the two sides went to war and the Russians acquired the rest of the 
Caucasus above the Arax River in the Treaty of Turkmanchai of 1828 (2).
Under direct Russian tsarist military rule, the khanates were turned into provinces of 
the Russian empire. From the 1840s until the Russian civil war which began in 1918 
Russian civil and criminal law functioned in the Caucasus. The Muslim Azerbaijanis, 
however, were repressed as subjects of tsarist rule because of their non-Christian status. 
Religious courts had little juridical function and Muslim religious publications were 
censored. Furthermore, Azerbaijani majorities in several provinces were extremely 
underrepresented in local administrations. The Russian political system under tsarist 
rule allowed power concentration in the hands of the landowning gentry and the royal 
family. Matters of national importance were left to small groups of officials with highly- 
decentralized power. The Russian regime, favoring the Annenians who were seen as 
being more akin to Russian cultural conformities, handed the Armenians extensive 
decision-making powers in Baku on behalf of the tsarist family. This authority was 
compounded by the absence of elected assemblies or town meetings. The Azerbaijanis 
in rural regions, however, did maintain their traditional lifestyle, which was indicative 
of Muslim culture, and the Azeri Turkic dialect continued to be used in the region by 
the Azerbaijani people.
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When vast amounts of oil were discovered in Baku in the 1870s, many Russians and 
Armenians migrated there to gain riches, thus tipping the demographic balance in favor 
of normative elements. This caused resentment among the native population since they 
viewed their region as again being invaded by foreigners and subjected to further 
foreign regulations and domination. There was no attempt to dispel the foreign elements 
from the Eastern Caucasian region, however, as the strength of the Russian military 
forces would not permit it and as the foreigners' toils began to amass wealth for the city 
of Baku.
While oil provided a profitable career for many normatives, Azerbaijanis were 
pushed into the working class and did not participate in reaping the benefits of the oil 
industry even though, on the whole, the residual effects of this industry were 
contributing to modernizing the city. Along with modernization came greater 
intellectual pursuits among society, and an Azerbaijani intelligentsia emerged alongside 
the increasing number of educated elites. Furthermore, Azerbaijanis were able to find 
some wealth in the refinery business and in traditional industries such as cotton 
production and other agricultural pursuits.
By 1901, Baku became the world's leading oil manufacturer. As fortunes were 
amassed, most of the net profits were going to Armenians and foreign companies, while 
Azerbaijanis were identified distinctly as the working class. The Russian central 
administration, finding the Armenians as either more competent or simply more to their 
liking, were increasingly placing Armenians in administrative positions. The 
Azerbaijanis, the largest indigent population in Baku, were effectively eliminated from 
being able to express discontent in official circles. Competition among the business 
classes began to take on a distinctly nationalist tone, and the labor class, composed 
mainly of Azerbaijanis, began to voice their discontent rigorously about the demanding
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requirements of their work. Violence in the rural regions began in 1905 over complaints 
about the levels of taxation and the limited availability of water and land for the 
peasants. Rural areas exhibited distinct ethnic expressions as villages started to separate 
themselves along ethnic lines. In the cities, labor unrest manifested itself in strikes and 
violence. Intellectual elites began to form political organizations to represent and redress 
the grievances of the labor organization. These labor groups were most visible in the oil, 
textile and semi-skilled sectors, and the composition of several of these organizations 
took on a distinctly Azerbaijani flavor.
Oil industrialists attempted to address the issues of the workers in 1905 by appealing 
to govenunent officials to grant increased rights to workers, and after martial law was 
imposed in Baku in 1906, events returned basically to normal. In this instance, normal 
meant the continuation of exploitative activities against the Azerbaijani and labor 
groups and the continued overrepresentation of Armenians in administration coupled 
with extensive imderrepresentation or total nonrepresentation of Azerbaijanis. Normal at 
this time also could be defined by the suppression of religious freedom. Muslim leaders 
had to be loyal to the state first when exercising their duties as clerics. This required 
sermons on the law of the tsars rather than the law of Allah. Normal also meant that 
secondary education was to be in Russian, and those who were taught in their native 
language were not prepared for the rigors of higher education or work in the state 
apparatus (that is, had the opportunity presented itself).
Workers again revolted in 1913 in response to the overextended working day, their 
lack of days of rest and the decline in real wages. Despite company agreements, 
dissatisfaction continued until World War One, when worker grievances took a 
secondary place of concern among the industrial bosses. Azerbaijanis were exempted 
from the war because they were Muslim and the oil industry continued to conduct its
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business throughout the war, producing oil to be provided to the Russian army.
Before the conclusion of the war, the Russian tsarist system was dissolved. The 
breakdown of the administrative structure of the state was hastened by the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917. The civil war in Russia resulted in battles between White Russian 
forces and Red Bolshevik forces. While the battle raged in Russia proper, chaos 
exploded in the Caucasus. Russian and Armenian Bolsheviks, incorporating 
Azerbaijani Socialists, established a Baku Soviet and assumed control of the country's 
most populous and industrialized city. Azerbaijani and other minority pro-nationalist 
organizations moved their headquarters to Genje. Elections in Azerbaijan had been held 
in 1917 after the tsar abdicated his throne in St. Petersburg. The elections were 
conducted in order to create a new-fangled Constituent Assembly to greater promote 
Azerbaijan's interests, but before it convened, a Transcaucasian Diet or Chamber was 
established as a temporary administration over the entire Caucasus region. When 
Ottoman forces crossed into the Caucasus to secure the territory it had regained in the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918, the forces agreed only to deal with the 
representatives of independent states and not some provisional committee. The 
nationalist Musavat Party, which had been gaining popularity since its founding in 
1911, used an anti-colonial, sovereign-state platform to gain support for independence 
from Russia, and increased its influence in Azerbaijan.. As opposed to being seconded 
by the prevalent Baku Commune, which had been comprised of Muslim Bolsheviks 
who had gained popularity among the industrial lower class in Baku, the Nationalists 
declared independence from Russia.
It should be noted that nationalism among the Musavatists was not a repudiation of 
industrial socialism. While it was in opposition to the Social-Democratic parties of the 
era, it supported a platform which equated all peoples of various social standing.
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educational background, religion and the like. It was based on a populist platform, in 
fact, but it differed from the Hiimmet, the socialist party based in Baku, because it 
valued sovereign rights for the Azerbaijani people and independence from Russian 
colonial influence. For the nationalist Musavat, nationalism meant the recognition that 
the Azerbaijani people, "while a part of a larger family of Turkic peoples, constituted a 
nation of their own" (3). Ironically, they relied heavily on British forces to create a 
secure environment for the nationalists to rule themselves.
The nationalist leader, Khan Khoiskii, became the prime minister of the newly- 
independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) and he formed his cabinet in 
Genje on May 28, 1918. Baku was still dominated by the Baku Commune and its 
leaders, but was reincorporated as the government headquarters after British troops and 
the Army of Islam, comprised of an Ottoman unit and Azerbaijani and Daghestani 
volunteers, forced the retreat of the Red Army out of the city, effectively eliminating 
Communist control. The Ottoman troops then evacuated Transcaucasia after the 
Mudros Armistice was signed between the Allied and Entente Powers in October 1918. 
In 1919, British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George decided not to commit more 
resources to the Russian civil war and removed the British troops from Azerbaijan. The 
British remained in Transcaucasia, however, debating until 1921 which area in Asia 
would serve as the strongest buffer zone to protect India from Entente or Russian 
advances (4).
The withdrawal from Azerbaijan would prove to be a fatal move for the 
Azerbaijanis. Racked by failing coalition governments, unable to control expanding 
sympathies for Communism, stuck in a territorial battle with the Armenians for land 
(including Nagorno-Karabakh), not having gained recognition of their independence 
from the international community, and lacking any kind of unified, strong army, the
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Azerbaijani forces were unable to hold off the Armenians on the West and the 
Bolshevik army on the North. The Bolsheviks entered Baku in April 1920 and 
demanded the surrender of the Musavat-led coalition government. The Communists met 
with little resistance and the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee declared an 
independent Soviet Republic. The Reds finished their takeover of the nation by seizing 
industry and communication links. Resistance by villagers in the countryside were 
ineffective.
After the fall of Armenia and Georgia to the ^ Bolshevik armies, the three nations 
were incorporated into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic 
(TSFSR), and became members of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's 1922 Union of the Soviet 
Socialists Republics.
The Soviet Union: Between Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism
The Soviet Union which was to emerge was built on the foundations of 
Communism without having fully appreciated the failings of the Communist doctrine. 
The Soviet Union ended up becoming a strict authoritarian state.
In authoritarianism, ideology plays a strong role in guaranteeing the reproduction of 
the system. Ideology promotes the state as the unifying institution for protecting the 
population against the "corruptible" elements associated with diversity. It acts as a 
stabilizing force among the classes, and against extremist propaganda, and promotes the 
state as the only mechanism for modernization and development. Authoritarian regimes 
want to integrate society into the state to make it more productive and to give the state 
ultimate control over the people. Order and stability are seen as desirable goals to 
prevent cleavages and a breakdown in the concentration of power belonging to the state.
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Authoritarian regimes use ideology to mobilize the masses toward a common goal, 
the state's goal. It induces the population to become part of the newly-formed 
organization created by the state to benefit society. The ideology of communism 
became the tool by which the leaders of the Soviet Union strengthened and protected 
their power, adhering to an antibourgeois doctrine. They criticized the contemptuous 
lifestyle of the bourgeoisie and an economic system which they claimed did nothing for 
the masses and was totally fraudulent. The authorities claimed that they could direct 
society to a system in which all members would equally benefit from their labor and 
would be included in directing the goals of society. When this equality to the access of 
the means of production was achieved, the central authorities would no longer be 
required and society could function based on the tenets of fairness and exactitude. The 
ideology, seemingly egalitarian, could not be effected, and the leaders realized that in 
order to maintain their leadership over society, enforcement mechanisms were needed 
which would bind society to the ideology, even thought that ideology would prove itself 
to be unable to address economic and social grievances. The most outstanding feature 
used to enforce ideology was through the secret police force. The Cheka force, later 
renamed the KGB, functioned as the iron fist of the political rulers. Such a mechanism, 
called an "auxiliary structure" in political science circles, served as a maintenance 
mechanism for power and was the administration's means for manipulating the masses 
into subservience. Official police investigations could be avoided and "unofficial" 
police activity gained free reign to protect the state from subversive or other potential 
enemies. Arrests of dissidents, executions, assassinations, and attacks on perceived 
opposition groups occurred covertly. In the authoritarian regime the activities of the 
secret police did not face any investigative questions as individuals did not wish to 
become the targets or victims of this auxiliary structure. The KGB's strength in the 
Soviet Union, along with the official ideology, created a formidable obstacle to
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opposition to the Soviet cadres.
In the USSR, the one-party system was also a tactic by which the authoritarian 
leaders maintained control over the masses. The lack of competing interests associated 
with a multi-party system eliminated political opinions from being expressed in 
legitimate fora. The party-state apparatus, using institutionalized political structures 
maintained through a highly-centralized and bureaucratized system, attempted to seize 
support and incorporate the public into the one-party organization. The party’s 
preoccupation was to implement ideology and modernize the state through mobilizing 
mass popular support of the party's methods for development. The party, whose 
ideology conflicted with its actual existence, ended up acting merely as a symbol of 
state power and lacked any real influence in mobilizing the public. Party members often 
found better jobs in society, but the political interests of the public rarely coincided with 
the party's actions and functions. Through the use of propaganda, the Communist party 
in the Soviet Union continued to enjoy a role in the Soviet system's authoritarian 
profile.
Ideology, the one party system and auxiliary structures are the main methods for 
authoritarian systems to project the will of the leader on his or her subjects. 
Institutionalized methods of repression and guarantees for the perpetuation of the 
population in their social roles, along with centralized economic processes and restricted 
access to the modes of production, aimed to increase the strength of the state and 
concentrate power in the hands of a few. While the authoritarian state was strong on 
ideology and enforced commitment to the party and the General Secretary, it neglected 
to find sufficient means for recovering from several economic and social crises and 
preordained its downfall. The lack of contributing actors and decentralized 
management, combined with no expectations of accountability on the part of the rulers.
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caused a system in which complete stasis in economics and control over social relations 
preceded total collapse of the system. Democracy, unlike this system, attempts to create 
an environment of accountability, decentralization and contribution in order to avoid 
stasis and domination and to prevent a breakdown of the system.
In addition to these control mechanisms, the central authorities in the USSR 
employed other tactics to forge a nominally cohesive union. They sought to eliminate 
any local distinctions which distinguished various identities from other identities in the 
Soviet Union. The attempts to dismantle the peculiar qualities of the people led to 
central control over all aspects of life. Characteristic differences of literature and 
language were degraded, which caused divisiveness rather than unity, and territorial 
boundaries were redrawn in an attempt to integrate all members of the Soviet Society, to 
blur the concentrations of "peoples" in any given region. The long-fought for region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia had attempted to annex to expand its borders and 
unite the Armenian population there with the Armenians in the Armenian Republic, and 
which had been part of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, was again "awarded" to 
the Azerbaijan Republic in 1924. This move, which came as a reversal to an earlier 
decision to hand over the area to the Armenian Republic fed fuel to the fire which had 
been burning between the Azerbaijani and Armenian people since the Russian take-over 
of the Caucasus.
Josef Stalin's 1936 constitution abolished the TSFSR and made the three previous 
members of the Federation distinctive Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of the USSR. 
It also elevated Khazakhstan and Kirghizistan to Soviet Socialist Republic status. The 
effect of the changes aggrandized central control and destroyed horizontal 
communications, that is, all communications functioned from party to republic and little 
or no republic to republic communication existed. The constitution reaffirmed the
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division of territorial and national territorial districts. These distinctions were made to 
guarantee smaller ethnic minorities' representation in the Politburo, but it only served to 
enhance ethnic feuds. The territorial divisions were arbitrary and dozens of ethnic 
groups were left without any representation in the national legislature. Many more were 
excluded from the Supreme Soviet, the central governing body of the USSR.
The division of the union into 15 union republics, with smaller administrative units 
amounting to hundreds of tiny territories was Stalin's means of dividing and conquering 
the ethnic divisions in the USSR. It also created difficulties later in trying to separate 
grievances that spread among the Union between legitimate and illegitimate claims for 
secession. The whole concept behind the union has been succinctly surmised. Stalin's 
entire political system "was based on politicizing and then repressing nationality so that 
the only cross-cutting institutions were the party, the secret police and the army 
institutions he believed the center could always control (5)". This was an unusual means 
of maintaining his authority and led to many of the problems which have emerged in 
Azerbaijan and other former Soviet Union Republics today.
In addition to this, Stalin embarked on a great purge to rid the Union of remaining 
bourgeoisie and nationalist elements. His purges, forced deportations and alienation of 
past leaders are incomparable in history. The numbers of victims of Stalin's purges can 
not be given a fixed figure. Azerbaijan did not receive a reprieve from Stalin's purges. 
Peasants in the countryside were victimized, intellectual elites were liquidated, threats 
were even hoisted against the émigré community. The purges included not only people 
but works of art and literature. Stalin's faithful Azerbaijani first secretary of the 
Communist Party, Mir Jafar Baghirov, continued the purification of Azerbaijani society 
even after the second world war. Although the number of missing bodies was reduced, 
Baghirov promoted campaigns which would reduce the elements of nationalism.
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religious doctrine and literary treasures. Even the revered Dede Korkiit, the famous epic 
poem of ancient Azerbaijani civilization, was denounced by Baghirov. Soon after this 
event, however, Stalin died and Baghirov was put on trial in Azerbaijan for crimes of 
anti-Soviet aims against Azerbaijan. He was executed.
During Nikita Kruschev's tenure as Communist party general secretary, a "thaw" 
occurred in all regions of the USSR. Prominent figures from the past were rehabilitated 
and equality of the Soviet nationalities was endorsed as official policy. The Republics 
were given greater control over the distribution of wages and income, but Kruschev 
continued past policy practices in seeking greater control over the republics firom 
Moscow. Kruschev also implemented institutional reorganizations and shifted his 
personnel around these institutions, alienating many of his clients and allies, in an 
attempt to enhance his authority.
At this time, a Kruschev crony. Imam Mustafayev took the reigns of the 
Azerbaijani communist party secretaryship. Neither Kruschev nor Mustafayev would 
last very long. Mustafayev was suspect for his apparent nationalist sympathies - he 
brought several ethnic Azerbaijanis to Baku in order to tip the balance of the local 
population toward the native group. He was removed on the pretext of corruption, and 
was replaced by Veli I. Akhundov.
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, who replaced Kruschev was a very powerful leader of the 
USSR and his tenure as general secretary lasted for 18 years. He had a strong 
clientelistic model and his expansive patronage network allowed several policy changes 
to be speedily and unquestioningly invoked. Despite Brezhnev's personality cult, and 
the apparent strength of the Union during these years, Brezhnev's era of Soviet history 
has been characterized as the era of stagnation. Brezhnev created a combined corporatist
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and welfare state which relied on developing heavy industry and applying scientific 
techniques to improving agricultural needs, including the increased production of 
mineral resources for fertilizers. In 1977, Brezhnev created a new constitution which 
defined the rights of the union and the separate functions of the republics. The 
constitution stated that the union had the right to interfere in all republican matters if it 
appeared that they were of all-union importance. The federation had no distinct 
separation of powers even though the constitution stated that the republics had the right 
to raise their own revenue. Even with this proviso, the republics were left dependent on 
financing allocated by the union budget which defined the targets of budget allocations. 
The primacy of the central authorities over the territories was reinforced. The advantage 
of this system laid in the ability of the central authorities to directly control all aspects 
of republic administration.
Collective activities and movements were kept in check and directed from the 
center. As a response to the creeping stagnation and the strict budgeting, the national 
territories attempted to advance their self-interests and the integrative pattern of the 
Soviet ideology, faced a major breakdown. The republic authorities tried to maximize 
their take from the all-union budget while minimizing their contributions to the Union.
The slowdown in the Soviet economy has been crystallized by its declining growth 
rates. While official figures appeared to prove that everything was normal and 
propaganda bolstered this opinion, the slowdown can be attributed to increased military 
spending and the growing expenditures on personal consumption in the 1960s and 
1970s.
In Azerbaijan, the stagnation of the Brezhnev period was evident. Azerbaijan's 
production of oil and its refineries continued to contribute more to the all-Union needs
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than it received in return. Akhundov’s regime in Azerbaijan for the decade 1959 to 1969 
has been classified "unexceptional". His rise, linked to his effort to revive the economy, 
was also the cause of his downfall. Production rates in the Azerbaijan SSR were 
minimal (6). Price undercutting for products which would have sold on the world 
market for much higher sums also contributed to Azerbaijan's poor growth levels. From 
1945 to 1969, the Azerbaijan SSR had the lowest rate of industrial growth of all the 
Union republics. Real per capita income nearly doubled in Azerbaijan between 1950 
and 1970, but still fell below the all-union average. At the same time, Akhundov's 
removal, while officially linked to corruption, can also be traced to his "inability to 
temper" the nationalism that was growing among party rank and file. Coupled with this 
nationalism was increasing outmigration of nonAzerbaijani nationals from the republic. 
Only in Nagorno-Karabakh did the number of normatives (Armenian) in the Azerbaijan 
SSR population grow. Criticism of Akhundov, though, was directed at his failures, 
matters of party discipline, problems of "localism" in recruiting party members, 
placement and cadres functioning, and cronyism.
Akhundov was replaced with Azerbaijan KGB chief Haydar Aliyev in 1969. Aliyev 
was well-liked by authorities in Moscow because of his long standing membership in 
the party and his intransigence toward corruption. Aliyev's promotion to first secretary 
of the Azerbaijan Communist Party suggested that profound changes would occur.
Aliyev, a favored protégé of Brezhnev, was actually quite successful in turning the 
economic situation of the republic around (7) even though, overall, the Soviet Union 
could not recover from its endemic economic problems. Even so, he doubled industrial 
production and increased agricultural output by nearly 100 percent during his stay as 
Azerbaijan's Communist Party first secretary.
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Politically, Aliyev was adept at rotating the placement of his protégés into various 
positions. His tenure began with a purge of most of Akhundov's cohorts. He filled his 
ranks with Azerbaijanis and technocrats and created a strong coalition at the top of the 
Azerbaijan Communist Party hierarchy. He appeared extremely sympathetic to 
Azerbaijani nationalist sentiments, but balanced his act with Moscow by promoting 
Russian studies and "atheistic education". He was also popular with General Secretary 
Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev, and in 1982 Aliyev was promoted to the 
Politburo and moved to Moscow.
Kamran Baghirov, who had worked as the party secretary responsible for 
propaganda and agitation under Aliyev, was moved into Aliyev's position in Baku. 
Despite the improvements in the economy during Aliyev's tenure, the Azerbaijan SSR 
was suffering from a shortage of food supplies and rationing began in 1984. This 
shortage revealed to all the extent of the breakdown of the USSR's economy. By the 
time Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Central Committee it was 
becoming clear that the Soviet Union was nearing economic collapse. The republics 
were racked by shortages of all commodities and a second economy had emerged which 
rerouted goods from their destination points to locations where the profit margin was 
higher. By the late 1980s, the past repression of nationalities had finally experienced a 
backlash of unleashed prejudices and rejection of forced Russification in several 
republics. From this, growing resentments between the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
populations intensified. The corroded lid which had capped these tensions for several 
decades was beginning to loosen as Gorbachev allowed greater freedom of expression 
and dialogue became heated.
Besides these troubles, the work ethic had deteriorated to the point that workers did 
not care about earning money because they had nothing on which to spend their wages
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and no results of their labors were visible. On the official level, employees were 
regarded as deficient in meeting the aims of a technologically-advanced society and the 
goals of socialist development. Employees were characterized as possessing low levels 
of productivity and labor discipline, indifference, and inertness. Despite the criticisms, 
employee productivity in illicit production and distribution, distortion of data and 
independent "under the table" initiative revealed extremely high levels of activity.
The whole logic of production in the 1980s had taken on a new twist which 
numbered the days of the Soviet Union's existence. The greatest amoimt of waste was 
included in production targets for fear of not being able to acquire raw materials in the 
future. Hospitals were keeping recovered patients in bed for fear of not meeting quotas. 
Women bearing children remained in hospital beds for an average of 14 days. Office 
jobs were considered disparaging work and business materials were in short supply. 
Useless goods remained in warehouses as stocks of low quality products increased to 
the 5 to 15 percent range. Prices were artificial. The Soviet Union prided itself on 
supplying housing for all citizens, yet in 1983, one fifth of all families shared common 
rooms in their homes with other families and minimum standards of health had only 
reached 1928 targets (8).
In the midst of this confusion, Gorbachev introduced perestroika (restructuring) and 
glasnost (opening) in the Soviet Union in an attempt to produce changes away from the 
stagnant system he had inherited. At this time, Gorbachev was by no means thinking 
that a breakdown of the Soviet system was imminent. It can be suggested that his policy 
changes were made in order to locate some untapped creative input to resolve the severe 
economic crisis which had emerged in the 1980s out of several decades of 
mismanagement.
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Additionally, new scientific-industrial technology required more worker 
participation including information processing and conducting nonstandard operations, 
which used technological skills and not just mechanics. Active involvement of the entire 
population was required to resolve the very serious problems plaguing the Soviet 
economy.
This perestroika, however, led to the emergence of thought based on individual and 
compact group needs. The ideology of the Communist Party had broken down. 
Collectivist interests were not a primary concern for most individuals. As they began to 
fear the institutions of the party less, many voices were raised in protest of the entire 
system. Accompanied by this was Gorbachev's acknowledgment that economic 
problems could not be solved within the structure of the system within which he was 
operating. At the same time, though, he knew that replacing the system would produce 
greater hardships on the public. In the newly opening environment, public discontent 
was capable of creating a corrosive impact on the leader's authority. The plurality of 
political demands undermined his authority and the rationale for the one-party system.
Despite reform measures that had been undertaken, Gorbachev continued to assert 
his leadership as the stalwart of the Communist Party, the economy continued to 
deteriorate, no visible results could be seen in his attempt to expand consumer goods 
and services, the structure of state and society's relationship toward central planning 
had not evolved, pricing and supply allowed for state domination over fees and output, 
political battles detracted from planning, and no vision for the Soviet future had been 
created. On top of this, energy production was declining and unemployment was rising. 
Gorbachev had only ceded limited opportunities for private ownership in areas where 
the state sector was not working effectively, but bureaucratic procedures barred or 
postponed most chances for privatization.
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By the end of the 1980s, three elements of Soviet thought had emerged among 
reformists. They have been defined by Sovietologist Murray Yanowitch of Hofstra 
University in Hempstead, New York. Yanowitch says the values of economic, political 
and social fieedom had gained primacy, private ownership of property needed to 
become the material foundation for political democracy and an efficient economy, and 
the minimalist state, "subordinate to the principles of liberalism", was largely confined 
to the responsibility for the enforcement of law (9).
In the meantime in Azerbaijan, Baghirov had been assuming the old party-politics 
and taking no initiative on his own. Baghirov never addressed perestroika or glasnost 
and reform had not touched any areas of Azerbaijan society. Conservative partisans in 
Moscow could be proud of Baghirov as they continued to encourage him and other 
Communist leaders to limit the implementation of the partial reforms and glasnost.
While economically and politically little had changed in Azerbaijan, socially, many 
old sentiments were expressing themselves anew. In 1988, nationalist tensions came to a 
head between Armenia and Azerbaijan when Armenia demanded the transfer of 
Nagomo-Karabakli to the administration of Armenia. Moscow had agreed to review the 
status of the autonomous oblast (district) and this angered many Azerbaijanis who felt 
their territory was going to be taken from them. Additionally, two Azerbaijanis were 
said to have been killed in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and many in 
the population of Azerbaijan responded with retaliatory violence. The Azerbaijani city 
of Sumgait experienced a pogrom which expelled many Armenians from their homes. 
As punishment for the violence pursued by radical nationalists, Baghirov was ousted 
from his position as Azerbaijan's first secretary and replaced by Abdulrahman Vezirov. 
Moscow then decided Nagorno-Karabakh should remain in Azerbaijan, and the central 
authority promised to implement economic and social reforms in the Nagorno-Karabakh
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Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).
The NKAO unilaterally seceded from the Azerbaijani Republic in early July 1988 
in defiance of the Soviet Constitution. By the constitution's decree, the Republic 
Azerbaijan, in which the NKAO is a territory, needed to consent to this move. Leaders 
in Azerbaijan attacked the move as illegal. The Supreme Soviet later that month 
established the Volskii Commission, headed by Arkadii Volskii, to review the 
feasibility of a territorial transfer of the NKAO. In 1989, Moscow took over 
administrative control of Nagorno-Karabakh from January until November of that year 
on the advice of the Volskii Commission. This administration transfer further worried 
the Azerbaijani public of the security of their territorial integrity. Simultaneously, in the 
USSR as a whole, social pressures were overriding the gradual pace of reforms. 
Informal organizations had arisen which led to the realization that formal social 
organizations could not respond to workers' grievances. Officialdom could not answer 
complaints of low wages and increasing unemployment.
During this period as well, revived and new legal political organizations were 
springing up from the intelligentsia. These popular fronts had no clearly defined 
political goals at first, but formed the first real opposition to the unitary party in the 
Soviet Union. Media accelerated this politicization of the masses as independent 
newspapers were created alongside the state mouthpieces.
The variations in the level and pace of reforms across regions and ethnic groups 
created a platform on which fronts could raise the consciousness of the varying 
nationalities. Resentment toward the past forced Russification, imposed industrial 
techniques which squandered resources, and suppressed national tendencies created the 
first basis on which republics could demand national independence.
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Wliile most of these demands were coming from high-level authorities of the party 
ranks within various republics, Azerbaijan's Vezirov continued to use party palliatives 
to appease the republic's citizens. He reiterated Moscow's claim that ethnic problems 
were created by past leaders' inability to improve the economy and reduce corruption. 
He was very slow in addressing glasnost and democratization and he resisted the 
increasing calls for reform.
When the Nagorno-Karabakh issue again caused heavy tensions between the 
neighboring republics, Vezirov was powerless to control them. In January of 1990, 
Azerbaijanis responded to pent-up frustrations caused by Vezirov's mismanagement of 
the crisis and Armenia's declaration of its annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by rallying 
in Baku. The leading political organization in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Popular Front 
(PFA) which had come into existence the year before, had organized the rally, 
hnmediately after the rally, however, the unrelieved frustrations manifested themselves 
tlirough more violence. In response to aggravations which had beep brewing over the 
increasing number of Azerbaijani refugees in Baku who had congregated there after 
being expelled in 1988 from the Armenian Republic, radical nationalists began rioting 
and evicting Armenians from their homes in Baku. Before the end of 1990 virtually no 
Azerbaijanis lived in Annenia and no Armenians lived in Azerbaijan outside of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Red Army responded to the violence in Baku. Although the fighting had already 
quieted down before the army's arrival, the forces used excessive violence against the 
Azerbaijanis, resulting in 200 dead and 700 wounded in Baku (10). The month came to 
be known as "Black Januaiy'". Moscow's response to the upheaval was the removal of 
Vezirov from power and his replacement with Ayaz Mutalibov. Mutalibov would 
briefly politically survive in Azerbaijan after the country gained independence. He was
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elected president of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan in a one-candidate contest.
Just after Black January, the Third Congress of People's Deputies convened in 
Moscow and Lithuania claimed its independence, while at the same time Gorbachev 
was proclaimed the president and was conferred excessive powers to rule the dying 
union. While wrapped in the rhetoric of reform and democratization, Gorbachev was 
handed ultimate powers as president including the power to declare a state of 
emergency, to appoint and dismiss senior armed services officers, to authorize a vote of 
confidence, to take measures for the defense of the Union's sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of the union republics, to veto Supreme Soviet decisions and more. These 
powers effectively gave Gorbachev far-reaching mechanisms to deal with the crises that 
were mounting. Nonetheless, Gorbachev continued to lose his legitimacy as the union's 
leader as the Gross National Product (GNP) of the Soviet Union steadily dropped and 
artificial prices could not support the falling output and decline of productivity.
Tensions continued to grow and violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh region mounted 
as Armenia adopted plans to increase its influence in the area and remove Azerbaijan's 
power. In August 1991, after the coup attempt to overthrow Gorbachev, of which 
Mutalibov is said to have at first supported and then, after its failure, rejected, 
Azerbaijan claimed its independence under the 1977 constitution's article granting 
republics the right to secede. It was recognized by Turkey in the coming weeks followed 
by several other nations, and became a full member of the United Nations in February 
1992. The remaining republics of the Soviet Union soon capitulated to centrifugal 
forces in the end of 1991 and the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics.
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The Residual Effects of Soviet Rule
It is apparent that Soviet controls over the population at large and the republic state 
apparatuses were many. The Central Committee created institutions which safeguarded 
and elevated its members into positions of prestige and privilege. The members of the 
Committee manipulated the levers which made the state function using the party as its 
bulwark and imposing communist ideology on the masses. For a union the size of the 
former USSR, this ideology was bound to win over several converts through the use of 
propaganda.
Communist ideology took on many forms in order for the authorities to perpetuate 
it and, thereby, their own control. These forms of ideology can be cited as anti- 
Semitism, anti- nationalism, anti-bourgeoisism and anti-liberalism. The ideology 
remained a very cohesive concept throughout the Soviet authoritarian regime. Those 
who behaved in an inimical manner to the state, i.e. those who behaved in their own 
self-interest or those who valued independent beliefs and cultural autonomy, were 
enemies of the state. The penalties for being an enemy persuaded several citizens to 
adopt the official line.
For those with whom propaganda did not make headway, the Soviet leaders could 
enforce "allegiance" to the ideology through the use of auxiliary structures, most 
notably, the KGB. Society was demobilized and the KGB prolonged this reduction of 
individual activity in society through forceful methods. It followed its orders which 
were molded around the idea that the only framework for social integration remained 
along the lines of Stalin's divide and conquer policy.
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When it appeared from the mid-1970s onward that the system was experiencing a 
breakdown, economically, and in turn ideologically, the auxiliary structures erected 
increasing numbers of barriers against elements which threatened the continuity of the 
system. However, when perestroika broke loose from the party's central controls and 
became a force of its own among the populace, the party's props used for control lost 
their might and the institutions began to breakdown.
The breakdown of the authoritarian institutions was provoked by crises which could 
not be avoided. Gorbachev realized it was impossible to solve all the crises without 
some form of "interactive" policy formulation. This interaction needed to be extended 
beyond the brittle and corrupted party members and their decrepit institutions and 
required direct input from the demobilized and disenfranchised public.
Such were the events that gave birth to popular support for democratic institutions 
among the members of the USSR's nationalities. The first manifestation of popular will 
in policy management was the widespread support for more open discussion and 
rejection of the prevailing system by the public. This notion did not at first embody the 
idea of multi-party elections, and other concepts of freedom and choice are still slow to 
emerge in the former Soviet Union. It has been observed that the interpretations of 
democracy among the public before the USSR's dissolution was limited to abstract 
notions of limited political rights for the opposition associated with low levels of 
tolerance by the public for those in separate ideological camps, and continued respect 
for central authority over aspects of life such as public order (11). Overall, however, the 
population favored such guarantees as personal safety, freedom of speech and 
consciousness, cultural autonomy, equality before the law and rights to privacy. The 
demand for the delivery of human rights, which had been replaced by collectivist rights 
such as the right to work, right to education and health, and the right to social insurance
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and housing, was a major catalyst in undermining the authoritarian system. These 
demands compounded with the emerging opportunities to engineer economic reform 
and free and fair elections contributed to the breakdown of the old system and revealed 
consent for a system based on individualism within an organized and coherent society.
The future of the Republic of Azerbaijan will be marked by assorted complexities 
and an indeterminate political forecast. Azerbaijan, created on foundations which reveal 
a mixed political orientation and stop-and-go development patterns, presents a curious 
record for evaluation and consideration. Azerbaijan is blessed with abundant natural 
resources and a strategic location, but is also plagued by internecine ethnic conflicts and 
obscure political programs. Azerbaijan's current political dynamics and civil society are 
built from a long history of imperial subjugation, a brief but frenetic jaunt with 
independence and a Soviet past characterized by compliance with unjust republican and 
federalist policies.
Emerging from all these conflicting inputs, Azerbaijani society is attempting to erect 
a state constructed on democratic principles, but is restricted by conflicting elements. 
While Azerbaijan has officially promoted democratic principles in theory, it has faced 
excessive obstacles in practice that have revealed a disquieting tendency to revert to· 
obeisance in times of distress. As there does not appear to be any alleviation to this 
distress in the short-term, Azerbaijan may suffer some unfortunate consequences by 
bowing to authoritarian inclinations, however much popular intentions are sympathetic 
to democratic nonpareils.
The public in Azerbaijan, which may now be free to practice Islam and to reform 
their alphabet, may also be limited in their future endeavors toward forming 
organizations and embarking on commercial ventures. The low perceptions or value of
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widespread participation and public contestation in multi-party elections, concrete 
symbols of democracy, and the continued acceptance of a subordinate/superordinate 
relationship between the nation's leader and his or her constituents may act in the end to 
deny the Azerbaijani public of its basic human rights. It appears that a system which 
uses nondemocratic methods in order to pave the way for future democracy is emerging. 
This is a continuing setback for all nascent democracies, Azerbaijan is no exception in 
this case. However, by allowing authoritarian behavior by the nation's leaders, 
Azerbaijan is creating a risk which may prevent or exceedingly delay democracy's 
arrival. These setbacks are apparent in the public's acceptance of weak political 
institutions and unplanned administrative turnovers. The infrequency of democracy in 
use in Azerbaijan is also apparent in the conduct of the nation's leaders in establishing 
and implementing foreign and economic policies.
Regime Change and Institutionalized Forms of Democracy
The first characteristic of a democratically-elected government, as was stated in the 
first chapter, is the nature of sovereignty which is irrefutably accepted among the 
members of the nation. The national government's preeminence as representative of the 
citizens of the state is unquestioned. In democracy, also, the relationship of the head of 
state and the citizens is also a highly-valued and symmetrical affair. Mutual respect for 
the system of governance and the powers and confinements of the people involved is 
meant to be very secure and understood. In Azerbaijan, however, the minor instances of 
adherence to the established rules and standards of practice reveal a disquieting 
tendency to reject or merely disregard democratic principles. It will be necessary for the 
uninterrupted practice of democracy to continue before Azerbaijanis can fully utilize 
and take advantage of the system.
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This lack of commitment to democracy thus far reveals two inferences as to the 
potential future nature of politics in Azerbaijan. The first inference which can be made 
is that the level of various and extensive crises in Azerbaijan will limit the survivability 
of the regimes as the leaders' legitimacy is undermined by forces difficult to control and 
direct. This can be seen by the loss of respect and position once prominent leaders 
experienced after they were unable to resolve deep and prolonged crises. Hasty and 
uncareful actions will undermine democratic functioning .and will increase the 
likelihood of haphazard and ill-conceived solutions.
Another inference which can be surmised is that Azerbaijan is a long way away from 
developing the institutions which will make it a stable democracy. This can be 
concluded by reviewing the institutions and laws which have been passed in legislation 
and either rescinded or merely never executed. Much of the stasis is due to the rapid 
turnover of administrations, which correspondmgly reject the previous administration's 
proposals for resolving the many problems in Azerbaijan. The lack of organizational 
processes and disinterest in smooth implementation of agreed plans shows a 
considerable level of passivity toward consultative acts and long-term goal 
achievements.
These assumptions are firstly apparent in the method of regime change. In a 
democratic formula, heads of state are elected, serve their terms, and either run for 
office again or retire from office at the end of their term. Very rarely do leaders in stable 
democracies leave their posts before their terms of office are complete. Unusual events 
may force heads of state out of office. These events may include death, parliamentary 
votes of no confidence (which are conducted according to a strict constitutional 
framework which provides for this method of defeat), or impeachment (which also is 
conducted according to a prescribed constitutional system and only when the president
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has been accused of grave offenses against the nation's integrity and security).
In stable democratic systems, the "overthrow" of a government occurs through 
peaceful elections which are coordinated according to established laws using accepted 
rules of conduct and which follow a timetable clearly scheduled in advance and never 
rescheduled according to the intensity of the political climate. In democratic systems, 
the change of government is decided by electoral techniques which serve to reject the 
government and call for a peaceful transition and replacement when so willed by the 
public.
The first factor challenging Azerbaijan's future as a stable democracy is the 
questionable practice of the recent alterations of regimes through overthrows. In 
Azerbaijan, overthrow of the existing regime has been the primary means in which new 
leaders are brought to the political fore. There have been three presidents and two 
overthrows in Azerbaijan's history since independence. The overthrow rarely follows 
the methods of power transfer described above. After an overthrow has been completed, 
leaders then use nominally democratic methods to legitimize their ascension. It should 
be noted, however, that overthrow of the existing regimes in Azerbaijan has not 
occurred in total absence of popular support, but this support does not reveal itself 
through any established mechanisms.
Wlien Mutalibov became the first president of the independent republic, he was 
voted into power through popular elections. These elections were preceded by the 
republic's assertion of independence in August of 1991 after the coup plotters in 
Moscow failed to overthrow Gorbachev. At this time, the public supported 
independence and manifested its support by declaring its intent to secede from the union 
and electing its choice for head of state. At this time, no mechanisms had been
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established for transitions to democracy. Despite the popular revolt and rejection of the 
Soviet Union's authoritarian rule, Mutalibov ran unopposed for the presidency as the 
opposition candidates refused to run. The opposition, particularly the PFA, asserted that 
the very nature of the elections was not democratic in that the opposition had no time to 
organize since that had been prevented from meeting under the rules of martial law 
which had been in place prior to secession. They rejected the election, saying that there 
had not existed an opportunity for an even-handed campaign to emerge. Mutalibov won 
over 98 percent of the vote in an 85.7 percent voter turnout. His first accomplishment as 
the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan was to dissolve the Communist Party. He 
also lifted the martial law.
Mutalibov did not remain very long in the presidency and mass demonstrations 
catalyzed his ouster. He was accused of not preventing the massacre of Azerbaijanis in 
the hands of the Armenians over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in February 1992. The 
conflict had been steadily growing and by the time Mutalibov was ousted, it had reached 
the degree of an undeclared war. His inability to form an army out of the remains of the 
Azerbaijani veterans of the Soviet army caused many to be disenchanted with his 
performance. He continued to relish the idea that the Russians would support the 
republic, and left with this delusion, he became unresponsive and lost any semblance of 
popular support.
Members of the opposition parties who had emerged out of the Communist 
reformers and had retained their influence in the Parliament demanded Mutalibov's 
resignation in March 1992. The PFA, which had been reasserting its strength since the 
end of martial law, organized rallies outside the Parliament building and on March 6, 
1992, Mutalibov caved in to pressure and resigned. He was temporarily replaced by the 
Speaker of the Parliament, Yakub Mamedov.
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Unnerved by the growing war with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagomo- 
Karabakii, Mutalibov was brought back to power in May 1992 by a Parliament acting 
without a quorum. Mutalibov imposed a state of emergency on his return. In response to 
Parliament's actions, the Popular Front opposition stormed the government buildings 
and captured the airport and broadcasting centers. They refused to leave until Mutalibov 
was again ousted. Communist members of the government agreed finally to remove 
Mutalibov from power. Parliament then dissolved itself and erected a 50-member 
National Council composed mostly of PFA members. The PFA leaders rewarded the 
Communists by granting them seats in the Council, but the PFA took over the Interior 
and National Security Ministries. They also rescinded Mutalibov's state of emergency 
( 12).
Newspaper reports quoted members of the public participating in the demonstrations 
as saying they had been freed of a dictatorship. The Popular Front claimed it did not 
want to change one totalitarian system for another, and promised a coalition government 
which would represent a variety of interests.
Popular Front leader President Ebulfaz Elchibey also became a victim of an 
overthrow the following year. Public support for the change of regimes was not as 
enthusiastic the following year when Elchibey, who had been elected President with 59 
percent of the votes in a 73 percent turnout of registered voters during the previous 
year's elections, handed over power to former first secretary Haydar Aliyev in June 
1993.
The take-over of authority was sparked by a rebel commander, Surat Husseinov, 
who had been controlling a militia in the city of Genje. Husseinov, who had been an 
army commander during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, demanded the resignation of the
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prime minister, Isa Gambar, and after Elchibey had ordered troops to tackle him, he 
then demanded the resignation of the president. Husseinov could have become the new 
dictator had Elchibey not requested Aliyev's assistance. At the time Aliyev was the chair 
of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic's chairperson. Aliyev, who took over as 
Parliament speaker after the resignation of Gambar, promised to bring peace and 
prosperity. At the same time, Husseinov Vv^as bringing his troops closer to Baku and 
Elchibey fled to his native Nakhichevan. A week later, after refusing to return to Baku, 
Elchibey would appeal to the public on independent television to support him as 
president. But, it was too late. Parliament had already stripped him of his powers and 
entrusted Aliyev with his functions. Aliyev, in turn, while first rejecting Husseinov for 
his violations of "the constitution and democracy" would nominate Husseinov as prime 
minister the following week. Husseinov was elected to the post by a 36-1 vote in 
Parliament. He was also entrusted with the Defense, Security and Interior Ministries, 
clearly revealing a break in the concept of separating powers and creating a system of 
checks and balances. With a portfolio of this magnitude, it would appear that Husseinov 
would have made a formidable autocrat.
However, Aliyev was to become the charismatic figure in Azerbaijan, resurrected as 
a democratically-oriented nationalist out of his communist past. Aliyev suddenly had 
seemed to have experienced a metamorphosis. As recently as 1990, it appeared that he 
was still a Communist. He confirmed this image by revealing his dismay at the changes 
introduced by Gorbachev. He was quoted as saying that "No one imagined Gorbachev 
was such a reformer...! absolutely believed in him, that he would be an effective leader 
of our party. And so I voted for him. No one knew there would be such perestroika and 
glasnost" (13).
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As a nationalist, Aliyev successfully prevented Husseinov's rise in power by offering 
him a powerful position in government and then neutralizing his power by dismantling 
his army and reducing the effectiveness of the political position.
At this time, there were no street demonstrations. Only one man, Husseinov, had 
demanded Elchibey's resignation, and he was backed by the only effective army in 
Azerbaijan. Elchibey had been losing popular support. It was claimed that he ruled 
autocratically, that his government was corrupt, that he had failed to put together an 
army, and that he was inexperienced in government and therefore ineffective. To 
support these accusations of lost popularity, his national guard units refused to fight 
against Husseinov's forces when they were ordered to do so. It was under these 
conditions that Azerbaijanis refused to protest the undemocratic transition of power.
Aliyev's return was actually silently welcomed, as the Azerbaijanis neglected to 
remember the worst elements of his authoritarian style, including, his neutralization of 
opponents, and preferred to recall how Aliyev had restored the economy. They also 
hoped that his solid posture toward the war with Armenia would speed up its 
termination.
Aliyev attempted to act according to democratic prescriptions for a while. He 
defended his assumption of power by claiming that he used constitutional methods for 
the transition of political power. He was questioned so furiously by the Parliament that 
he retracted his statement (14). Under his nationalist guise and for the benefit of the 
international community, Aliyev would use seemingly democratic methods to legitimize 
his power. He called for a public referendum to assess Elchibey's popularity. The vote 
put the Elchibey reign to bed, although, some Elchibey supporters maintain that the 
referendum was illegal because only the legally-elected president can call the
40
referendum, and the Parliament's stripping Elchibey of his authorities was 
unconstitutional. On top of that the PFA chairman on referenda claimed the procedures 
for conducting the referendum were invalid. Regardless, the rejection of Elchibey 
opened the way for Aliyev to conduct new presidential elections. In the meantime, he 
had declared another state of emergency in the republic and had adopted his old 
methods of demobilizing the opposition. In the October 1993 election, he competed 
against two virtually unknown candidates, each of whom received less than 20,000 
votes of the total 92 percent turnout. Aliyev was elected with 97 percent on October 3, 
1993. There were claims that the elections were rigged, but independent monitors did 
not file any objections. Elchibey also complained that physical and moral pressures 
were placed on electoral commissions to falsify results and that during televised reports 
voters could be seen stuffing ballot boxes.
Though it may seem that resignations are a perfectly legitimate way for a leader to 
step down from office, it is apparent that the resignation of Mutalibov was forced 
through popular discontent and the demise of Elchibey's presidency was due to a 
military threat which could have cost more than Elchibey's life. In democracies, 
resignation of office is a limited occurrence. Mutalibov's ouster did not follow any 
standard procedures. Furthermore, public perceptions of threats to national integrity 
concluded Elchibey's term but not through any democratic method.
Surat Husseinov's role, under Aliyev's command, has also been reduced. He 
maintains his position as prime minister, which further reinforces the contention that 
political labels are meaningless, but his army has been disbanded and its members have 
joined the war in Karabakh or have been "liquidated". With a system which sees regime 
change occurring through forced resignations, overthrows and illegal referenda, it is 
difficult to see where the value of democratic principles is placed. If voting continues to
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be a method for leaders to manipulate in legalizing their unconstitutional ascensions to 
power, it is unclear when this process will ever be considered a useful instrument in 
demonstrating democracy.
As previously mentioned, Mutalibov's first legal matter revolved around the 
abolition of the Communist Party, a nondemocratic start for the republic and the ex- 
Communist leader, as banning political parties openly reveals authoritarian behavior. 
Communism as a theory is not authoritarian but the practice has proved to be so. To 
prevent the spread of the potentially revived popularity of this system, Mutalibov used 
an undemocratic method of reducing a threat to democracy. Mutalibov did help to 
inaugurate some institutions which would set the state on sound footing to begin their 
democratic revival. These first maneuvers included the creation of a government 
divided among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, typically found in 
several stable democracies. The legislative branch is responsible for passing laws and its 
functions are conducted by the Milli Majlis, or Parliament, which was originally 
composed of 365 members, even before the nation's independence, but has since been 
reduced to 50 members. The executive power has been entrusted to the President, who 
serves as head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The judiciary is independent of the other two branches. The Supreme Court, which 
is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, is the highest court in the land and has the 
authority of judicial review, judging the constitutionality of laws. The lower courts are 
responsible for determining the outcomes of criminal and civil cases. Though the 
constitution separates religion from the state, Mutalibov, in an attempt to gain economic 
assistance and trade opportunities with Iran, called for a "spiritual revival" in 
Azerbaijan, which included the invitation of the Iranian state prosecutor in November 
1991 to brief the judiciary on Iran's criminal system and its relation to Islamic law.
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Mutalibov again seems to be enacting measures which are contradictory to the tenets of 
democracy and the people's will but which appear to be useful in serving immediate 
goals. Iran has granted economic assistance since this ploy, and despite the officials' 
visit, the judiciary remains purely secular.
Party politics also began to unfold under Mutalibov. In the constitution, all citizens 
were given the right to form and join political parties, and to do so free of government 
interference. There are several political parties in the Republic of Azerbaijan, but under 
Mutalibov, and then again under Elchibey and Aliyev, these parties have been hindered 
from partaking in the political process, from holding rallies or demonstrations and from 
organizing meetiugs.
Some of the other democratic institutions which have been promoted by 
constitutional guarantees include access to platforms to enjoy the freedom of 
expression, a legally defined system for candidature associated with the right to run for 
public office in competitive free and fair elections, a mechanism by which 
representatives can respond to public concerns, access to a judiciary which promotes the 
right to due process of law and a free and open press. While some of these are peripheral 
to building a political democracy, they can all be assigned as elements of a stable 
democracy. Regardless of the constitutionality of the guarantees, the constitution is 
often foresaked in Azerbaijan.
Elchibey seemed to embrace the principles guiding the establishment of these 
institutions more than the other two leaders which have ruled over Azerbaijan. Elchibey 
issued a decree, in the midst of an ethnic war, guaranteeing the rights of minorities to 
cultural autonomy and he decentralized government to allow regions to determine their 
social policies. This was not enough, however, to satisfy the Nagorno-Karabakh
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Armenians who want total severance of their relations with Azerbaijan.
Regardless of these pluses, the purveyor of democracy in Azerbaijan can be cited for 
neglecting to abide by democratic principles. He even stated that an "evolutionary" 
approach to transforming Azerbaijan was difficult to continue under the threat of 
economic collapse and growing political tensions. On top of this, it was reported in 
March 1993 that Azerbaijani riot police were responsible for the deaths of six protesters 
demonstrating against Lezgin ethnic minority conscription to fight the Armenian- 
Azerbaijani war during a rally in the northern Azerbaijani city of Kusary. The interior 
ministry denied the charge, but in April Elchibey declared a state of emergency 
throughout the country for a two-month period. Under war conditions, the state of 
emergency justified banning political party activities. Mobilized groups supporting the 
integrity of the nation had their activities suspended. The move further suggests that the 
requirements of this new state precede the actions which would help to create a more 
sound political environment.
In addition to the state of emergency, when Elchibey was confronted with 
Husseinov's insurrection in Genje he said militaiy force would be used against the 
rebels even if it meant civil war. Before this, Elchibey had instructed his army chief-of- 
staff to rid the country of Husseinov, but he refused and was fired. Then Elchibey sent a 
three-man negotiating team to Genje to arrest Husseinov, but they were captured by 
rebel soldiers. Finally, Elchibey said, "The legitimately-elected government of 
Azerbaijan has the right to defend the country from falling into the control of criminals 
and bandits" (15). This is true but what he didn't realize is that the military forces would 
refuse to fight on behalf of the legitimately-elected government, revealing that the 
government had ceased to be very legitimate. The mere fact that the military 
commanders refused to take orders and did not face reprisal suggests that the
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foundations of the government institutions are amiss.
As Elchibey was running out of options, he turned to Aliyev. Aliyev refused to 
accept the position of prime minister that had been vacated and Elchibey decreed to him 
several powers, after providing Aliyev the chair of the Parliament Speaker. This 
granting of powers left Elchibey little opportunity with which to reassert his strength as 
president later.
Aliyev would soon have room to move at his discretion as the Parliament voted to 
strip Elchibey of his powers as President. The Parliament, however, let Elchibey remain 
in office while Parliament decided whether to bring criminal charges against him for 
deserting his post. The Parliament ended up stripping Elchibey of his powers as 
president.
Aliyev's first act was to make the rebel commander the prime minister. He then 
continued to dictate in his usual authoritarian manner, refusing to make collective 
political decisions or share collective responsibilities with the government. Aliyev 
preaches that he is endeared to democracy but makes no attempts to utilize democratic 
methods. The difference, however, between Aliyev and the other presidents lies in the 
fact that they consider unilateral actions necessary to develop democracy, whereas 
Aliyev appears apathetic or even against the end result if it decreases his personal 
power. In democracy, though, a central theme exists that reciprocity between leaders 
and followers enhances the prestige and position of a fair leader.
By the time Aliyev removed the state of emergency on the eve of the presidential 
elections, he had managed to accumulate power in his own hands by decreeing major 
personnel changes in his cabinet and installing many of his former cohorts in positions
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over which he could guarantee control. Aliyev has also refused to cede his chair in the 
Nakhichevan Parliament. He preached democratic virtues when he first attained power 
in the government, but effectively neutralized his political opponents. One of his 
methods for reducing political opposition was through a presidential decree which 
transferred the Azerbaijan Publications House to the jurisdiction of the department of 
the president. The publishing house then claimed that it lacked printing plates, making it 
impossible to print any newspaper other than the president's "official mouthpiece", 
Azerbaijan. Newspapers such as Müsavat Party's Müsavat ceased publication after the 
announcement. It has been suggested that the claim of lack of materials was a response 
to the Parliament's voting down an amendment which would have allowed authorities to 
close down publications without acquiring a court order. The amendment, which was 
rejected 23-15, was one of the few fiilly-debated issues by the Parliament since Aliyev's 
assumption of power. Aliyev managed to implement his will in the end, however.
In addition to these acts, Aliyev admitted that the obligations of the nation during a 
state of war pre-empted implementing democratic guarantees including the safeguarding 
of human rights, freedom of conscience and equal rights for all citizens. He said that 
under the conditions of war, "The application of democracy and democratic principles is 
in conflict with the republic's work at the present time (16)." These comments and 
actions do not bode well for the future of democracy in the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Aliyev, it must be remembered, emerged during the days of Brezhnev from a KGB chief 
to a Communist Party first secretary. Regardless of the promises and rhetoric of change, 
it is unlikely that Aliyev's philosophies have altered. It was difficult enough for a 
proponent of democracy such as Elchibey to abide by its principles. Under the direction 
of Aliyev, it seems far-fetched to assume that the institutions and legal procedures 
embodied in democratic systems can be applied during his tenure and that the 
continuing war can be used as a pretense to prevent any type of democratization in
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Azerbaijan. The constraints of the war and the inlieritance of seventy years of 
Communist rule seem to preclude the emergence of genuine democracy in Azerbaijan. 
Unfortunately, democracy has so far failed to prevent war. This appears to be a primary 
failure of the system and necessarily forces the placement of the values of open society 
secondary to conducting a successful war to preserve the state. One ray of hope for 
democracy can be considered, though. As long as Azerbaijan continues to pretend to 
abide by democratic formulae, the principles may eventually sink into the Azerbaijani 
psyche.
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Chapter n i: Democracy and Foreign Policy in Azerbaijan
Foreign Policy Goals and Precautions
Alexis de Tocqueville, a founding father of democracy, was quick to point out the 
relationship between democracy and the success of a nation's foreign relations. He said 
that the virtues of decentralization and participation as well as the attention to freedom 
and community responsibility would create a condition favorable to propelling the 
power and prestige of the nation on an international level. The willingness to defend the 
interests of the nation and the love of country associated with the freedom inherited 
from democracy would strengthen the basis of foreign policy, would enhance the 
democratic order of the nation and would produce benefits to internal affairs. Under the 
assumption that democracy is the ideal system of government, as a democracy 
Azerbaijan can assert itself as a cohesive, united nation in which other nations could 
trust as stable. Nations would then prefer to associate and cooperate with Azerbaijan in 
developing foreign policy in developing trade, cultural and security guarantees to 
promote mutual and regional interests.
However, in developing foreign policy, Azerbaijan must consider the anarchical 
nature of the international system. The array of possible alternatives in developing 
foreign policy can easily lead to conflicting interests among nations and between foreign 
and domestic policy. Several mechanisms can be useful in developing sound policies 
which can bind effectively foreign and domestic concerns. These mechanisms include a 
strong organizational process among ministries, a clearly defined and delineated 
bureaucratic process, the constant and applied use of feedback processes and a 
continuing evaluation between goals and policy agreements taking advantage of private 
sector expert opinion.
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The conduct of foreign policy will play a central force in the development of 
Azerbaijan's government in the coming years. In relating foreign policy to democratic 
societies, it is essential to remember that in a democracy, as de Tocqueville said, 
participation is a primary tenet. Members of the public are supposed to be included in 
all policy decisions that will affect them. Azerbaijan's foreign policy inclinations will 
have a direct impact on the public at large. In the case of Russia, for instance, adhering 
to that sphere of influence will force the Azerbaijani people to accept policies that 
enhance Russia's position in the country. This would imply that whatever happens to 
The Russian Federation will create a spillover effect in Azerbaijan. Members of the 
public need to be included in the debate over whether what is good for the Russian 
nation is good for Azerbaijan. In the case of Turkey, cultural and educational policies 
which try to forge an ethnic alliance with Azerbaijan will affect Azerbaijanis 
perceptions of themselves. In the case of Iran, most of the aid that reaches the 
population has been a gift from the Iranian nation. Azerbaijanis may wish to forge 
closer ties to Iran if they see those ties directly benefiting the welfare of the individual. 
In these examples, the public's inclusion in foreign policy decisions may assist the 
nation's leaders in acquiring the greatest benefits from the cultural, economic and 
security ties with other nations. The public's opinion can also be sought to assist leaders 
in defining the foreign relations which will overwhelm personal growth among 
Azerbaijanis or will inspire disillusiomnent or unrest among society. Public sentiment 
can be used to distinguish between positive and negative outcomes of policy formation.
In instances of cultural, welfare and political policy, the ties to other countries are 
apparent. In addition, these ties are creating an overlap between foreign and domestic 
policy. More will be discussed in the next chapter on the types of democracies that 
exist, however, it should be mentioned here that in liberal democracy, the people must 
be included in policy making which will affect their welfare. This means, for instance.
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creating favorable trade policies that support the economic infrastructure. In a 
democracy based on conservative philosophies, the inclusion of the public in policy 
making is again essential for the reason that inclusion will guarantee policies which do 
not prohibit personal financial and social development. In a conservative democratic 
system this means allowing private direct investment from which people can benefit 
fi'om fi:ee enterprise and competition. In a democracy of this nature, the public must be 
allowed to make contacts with foreign companies on their own initiative and to pursue 
external markets. If a government, based on either liberal or conservative economic 
philosophies, wishes to create a viable system by which individuals can cooperate with 
foreign entities, an open environment in the creation of foreign policy will suit this goal. 
An open environment will allow individuals and business professionals to lobby for 
policies which will assist them in attaining their personal aims.
Furthermore, carefully debated foreign policy can avoid secondary, unintended 
troubles which may arise from affiliative constraints. Leaders which see the benefit of 
allying their nation with powerful nations in the global community may overlook the 
disadvantages of such arrangements. For instance, security guarantees which allow the 
placement of foreign troops on a nation's soil to protect members of a regional 
community may not perceive the risks at the time the treaty is signed. An example of 
this can be seen in Turkey's Provide Comfort Operation. The goal of the agreement 
among the United States, France, Britain and Turkey was to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Northern Iraqi refugees fi'om bases in Turkey. The leaders in Turkey did 
not expect that the traffic on the border would increase the way it did. Now. it has 
become difficult to monitor entrants to Turkey from that region. Refugees and militants 
have both been able to sneak across the border. Likewise, some of the aid packages 
being air dropped to the refugees is ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations. 
The humanitarian goal of the operation is being overwhelmed by the unforeseen
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drawbacks which hinder Turkey's fight against terrorism. Like the Turkish example, 
Azerbaijan, too, can be victimized by foreign policies which injure domestic interests. 
Careful deliberation on policy considerations among several actors can prevent most 
unexpected outcomes.
War seems to be the most difficult obstacle to achieving ideal democracies outside 
theories. Studies have revealed that democracies fight wars as often as nondemocratic 
nations, but it is also significant that democracies do not generally fight wars with other 
democracies (1). In a democratic system such as the United States, the commander-in- 
chief of the armed forces is also the president. He can decide to go to war, but like all 
the constraints he faces, he must receive the approval of Congress. Likewise, Congress 
must decide when a war is finished. This requires evaluating the sentiments of the 
population at large and determining how the population would respond in a situation of 
heightened national security controls. It would be hard for legislators to canvass their 
constituents when war necessarily requires a tactful and quiet administration in order to 
be conducted successfully. War also requires a quick response from leaders who do not 
have time to learn several opinions. The valued relationship between the leader of a 
nation and its citizens is at its most significant height during war. Often leaders can take 
advantage of the trust of the public to conduct war, or conclude other policies for the 
wrong reason. In the Falkland Islands War, which Britain fought with Argentina in 
1982, the public supported war because national pride disallowed an Argentine invasion 
on British territory. The government supported the war knowing that victory would 
spell popularity points in the next election. The British victory in the war resulted in 
excessive costs to the nation for the maintenance of a territory the nation had been 
planning to abandon in its long-term policy goals.
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Foreign policy initiatives of the various regimes in Azerbaijan as it relates to their 
struggle to attain some semblance of democracy will require public consensus. The 
Azerbaijani leaders have regarded the public only peripherally in their foreign policy 
conduct. This is not surprising as democracy has failed to remedy the exclusionary 
activity associated with the adoption of foreign policies. In fact, the essential failure of 
the democratic process has been its inability to conduct foreign policy in a transparent 
decision-making setting. Democracy has also been unable to avoid war with 
nondemocratic nations. Azerbaijan is experiencing a severe crisis in its relations (or lack 
of) with Armenia. It will be interesting to see how Azerbaijan's regimes have tried to 
attract support for its foreign policies and its war effort, and work to achieve democracy. 
It appears that the two endeavors will be mutually exclusive.
The Ties that Bind
Azerbaijan has been looking outward in its new independent orientation. It has been 
seeking bilateral agreements with several nations and membership in several 
international organizations, including NATO, the United Nations and the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation. Similarly, nations are discovering interests in Azerbaijan. 
Representatives from several countries have sought to involve themselves and profit 
from Azerbaijan's rich oil reserves. Still others are trying to impress the Azerbaijani 
authorities in other economic spheres, and other nations are hoping to revive their 
mutual cultural ties and become strong allies with Azerbaijan. The reasons for the 
interest in Azerbaijan are two-fold - economics and geopolitics.
On one level, nations want to associate themselves with Azerbaijan for economic 
reasons, namely to benefit from Azerbaijan's natural resources. The United States and 
Turkey, among others, are active in this area. Other nations like Iran wish to swing the
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spheres of influence toward the direction of their ideological and geopolitical interests. 
Conversely, Armenia wishes to destabilize the nation in order to earn concessions from 
Azerbaijan, either of an economic or a territorial nature or both. While intentions and 
actions of these nations may appear contrasting and even conflicting, Azerbaijan may be 
able to create a delicate balance in which it will benefit the most. As the country 
possesses many valued products, it has several bargaining chips to sell to the highest 
bidder. However, if Azerbaijan's authorities do not carefully weigh the options, their 
decisions may inject turmoil into their nation's domestic policies.
This risk is especially acute if the conduct of foreign policy is assumed under a veil 
of secrecy and irrespective of popular opinion, as the dangers of secretive foreign policy 
planning have been discussed above. This risk is accelerated particularly in a time of 
tense economic strain which will affect the nation for decades to come. For this reason, 
policy in Azerbaijan could benefit from measuring the temperature of the public and 
gauging their support for foreign policy initiatives. When the internal community's 
stance is considered, this only increases the components which contribute to realizing 
rational and beneficial decisions for the nation.
Azerbaijan's leaders since independence reveal a mixed record in their adopting 
rational decisions when formulating policy. This is especially true for the reason that 
Azerbaijan is dealing with many nations which are much more experienced in the 
conduct of foreign affairs, more developed, and which likely have experienced the worst 
pitfalls of an emerging nation. These nations know how to gain concessions while the 
policy makers in Azerbaijan are new members of the bargaining table. Even Russia, 
which is in the throes of modernization and new political formations, starts off on a 
stronger foot than Azerbaijan because of its prestige, (partially determined by its 
nuclear-power status), its size and its influence in the CIS and the other nations of
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Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The nations which have had the most 
influence so far in Azerbaijan's development are imdoubtedly Russia, Iran, Turkey, and 
Armenia. On a less influential but still meaningful level is the United States.
Conscious of the array of players with which they are negotiating in the 
international field, Azerbaijani leaders can use their understanding of their counterparts' 
experience to consider carefully how they wish to ally the country, what effect this will 
have on its emergence and appearance in the global community and what the nation 
should hope to achieve for itself internationally and on the domestic level.
Mutalibov, as a former Communist leader, pledged his support for continuing close 
bonds with Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union after Azerbaijan gained 
its independence. Before Azerbaijanis reaffirmed their devotion to independence in the 
December 1990 referendum, Mutalibov and the remaining Communist members of 
Parliament supported adherence to the State Council of the USSR. After total 
independence was achieved, Mutalibov signed the CIS agreement, but it was not ratified 
by the Parliament, reflecting the opposition's aversion to Russia and its potential 
strength in affecting decisions. While Mutalibov was supportive of Russia tliroughout 
his tenure, upon his demise as president he blamed Russia for playing a role in the 
Khojaly assault by Armenian troops of February 25-26 1992. In Khojaly, over 1,000 
Azerbaijanis were reported dead by the hands of Armenian militants who were said to 
be preceded by former Soviet troops. He said that survivors said the city continued to be 
under siege with tank and artillery attacks by the troops of the former Soviet Union. 
Moscow denied the reports (2). One reason Mutalibov was ousted was his failure to 
respond to events in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. He had not made provisions to 
create an army to figlit the Armenians, thinking that Moscow would assist him in this 
field.
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Despite Mutalibov's inclinations to continue ties with Russia, he wasn't totally 
dependent on Moscow. As was stated before, he courted Iran for assistance and received 
aid. He also requested increased trade with Turkey and in the fall of 1991, Turkey began 
shipping its sale of one million tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of flour. It also provided 
US$250 million in trade credits.
Though Turkey was the first nation to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, it has 
stepped cautiously in its approach toward Azerbaijan in order to preserve its bonds with 
Russia. Russia, despite its current economic weakness, still remains an important figure 
hi the region and a strong trade partner with Turkey. Turkish trade with Russia in 1991 
equaled $1.6 billion. Also, thousands of Turkish engineers and construction workers are 
employed in Russia and a Turkish construction company, GAMA, has a $35 million 
subcontract to build homes for former Soviet soldiers in the Russian Federation (3). 
Russia maintains that Azerbaijan is within its sphere of influence and is wary of Turkey 
for fear of pulling Azerbaijan away from that sphere.
Throughout Mutalibov's presidency Azerbaijan was in its developmental stages and 
few businesses inside Azerbaijan could reveal their international orientations. However, 
non-governmental organizations outside Azerbaijan were examining the nation to 
evaluate its investment potential. Azerbaijan's domestic politics were already beginning 
to be affected by future international agreements.
Before the Popular Front's leader was elected to power, Azerbaijan's foreign policy 
as an independent nation was still in the embryonic stages. But, Elchibey had several 
definite ideas about foreign policy initiatives. Most notable among his policies was his 
rejection of the CIS. He claimed that he wanted ties to all the nations of the former 
Soviet Union but that he wanted those ties to be of a bilateral nature. The effect of his
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rejection of the CIS was vivid. The former Soviet troops remained in Armenia and 
helped Armenia to create a regular national army. The Russian defense units in 
Azerbaijan were removed. Nonetheless, over the next year Russia and Azerbaijan 
signed 20 bilateral agreements. One of these agreements, signed in July 1992, arranged 
for Russia’s participation in protecting the border between Azerbaijan and Iran and 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. This included Russian control over air defense systems, 
recoimaissance and early missile warnings. Army personnel would have been trained by 
Russian specialists. None of the agreements so far have been executed.
Despite Elchibey’s resentment toward Russia, he was not unaware of the fact that tlie 
country needed Russian security ties and assistance in the war over Nagomo-Karabakli. 
Russia's main role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, however, was to play a mediating 
role. It co-sponsored with Turkey and the United States the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe's plan which called for the return of lands captured by Armenia 
between 1992 and 1993. In April 1993, it again called for an immediate cease fire and 
the introduction of observers in the territory. Russian President Boris Yeltsin continued 
his support for peace talks by calling both sides to come to the negotiating table. It is 
clear, however, that as long as Azerbaijan refused to join the CIS, Russia would be of 
little assistance to the nation in its war effort. It wasn't until Aliyev joined Azerbaijan to 
the CIS in September of 1993 that Russia began to adopt a more accommodating tone 
toward Azerbaijan. Public opinion polls in August 1993 suggested that the population 
was supporting the proposal to join the CIS, likely because Russia was seen as the only 
country which might assist in fighting the Armenians. Russian troops have agreed to 
enter the region as a peace-keeping force.
Elchibey's repudiation of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism likely reflects the current 
trend among the Azerbaijani Republic. Though Iran has sent clerics to work in the
56
religious schools in Azerbaijan, its attempts to impose its brand of Islam has been 
rejected by the state. The rejection was a concerted move by the Azerbaijani 
government under Elchibey, as ftmdamentalist tendencies would undermine the regime. 
This was already evident in the Talysh ethnic minority in Southwest Azerbaijan 
activities. Leaders of the region attempted to separate from the Republic and join in an 
independent republic with their ethnic kinsmen, the Mugan, in Iran. Furthermore, the 
rejection may have stemmed from Elchibey's resentment towards Iran's alleged 
supplying of goods and weapons to Armenia to undermine Azerbaijani gains in the war 
over Nagorno-Karabakh (4). Elchibey's fierce nationalism called for the reunification of 
Northern Iranian Azerbaijanis with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Iranians in turn said 
that Elchibey "lacks the insight needed for resolving the major problems besetting the 
country" (5). The disenchantment between Iran and Azerbaijan was viewed favorably in 
Washington, however, as the United States and Iran are opponents seeking influence in 
third nations. Washington sees Iran's influence as inimical to U.S. policy goals.
Elchibey's pro-Turkey stance was welcomed heartily by Turkey. As they are 
linguistically and culturally related countries, Turkey looked very favorably to 
Azerbaijan's turning to Turkey for assistance. Turkey has granted mass credits to 
Azerbaijan through its Ex/Im Bank and has supplied much needed food to the nation as 
Azerbaijan struggles with its growing refugee population. In addition, Turkey began 
exporting its television broadcasts to Azerbaijan to further unify the culture and 
language of the two nations. Also, Turkish businesses have been trying to set up shop in 
Azerbaijan since Elchibey's arrival in power. Turkey opened direct transportation links 
through airline flights between Baku and Istanbul and installed an elaborate 
telecommunications system in Azerbaijan.
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Of course, Turkey's interest is not purely philanthropic. Turkey needs another 
trading partner in which to distribute its surplus exports. Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, 
are the most attractive candidates, as the European Union (EU) continues to reject 
Turkey's full membership. Furthermore, in order to reach Central Asia where it hopes to 
increase relations, Turkey must traverse Azerbaijan. Turkey can benefit from 
Azerbaijan's relations with Central Asia to promote its interests there. Turkey is also 
vying for the much prized oil pipeline, hoping that a link to Azerbaijan's vast oil 
reserves will provide Turkey with prestige as well as bargain prices. Furthermore, with 
Azerbaijan as a trade and philosophical ally, it will be the first ally in the region as 
Turkey is surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbors. This alliance is further being 
cultivated by the fact both nations are adversarial toward Armenia. However, Turkey's 
resources are limited by its own troubled economy and growing inflation. As its 
shortcomings become more evident, Azerbaijan will continue to establish direct links 
with the West and to reduce Turkey's influence as a negotiator.
The United States has been viewed warmly but cautiously by the Azerbaijani 
govermnent under Elchibey. The 1992 Freedom Support Act, which the U.S. Congress 
passed as a means of showing its attentiveness to the former Soviet republics, 
specifically excluded Azerbaijan. The aid guarantee that was embodied in the Act was 
not extended to Azerbaijan as punishment for its economic blockade of Armenia. This 
lack of support, according to one observer, has hurt the democratic process, in 
Azerbaijan (6). The United States, while purporting its support for a peaceful conclusion 
to the war and the continuation of democratic development, is mainly interested in 
allowing its corporations access to the Azerbaijani oil market. This is their central 
interest in the region.
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The United States rejected Aliyev's ascension to power and the removal of Elchibey, 
saying that it was not a legitimate move. It nevertheless did not take any action toward 
restoring Elchibey, in the manner that it tried to resurrect Haiti's Aristide. This inaction, 
perhaps is due to the fact that Azerbaijan is not in the United States' backyard, and its 
administrative changes, regardless of how irregular, are not a priority concern. The 
United States has been playing a mediating role in the Nagomo- Karabakh crisis, and 
finally, in the past year, did condemn the Armenian government for its seizure of 
Azerbaijani territory.
Such were the events that had unfolded by the time Aliyev had come to power. 
Whether they were democratic or not is difficult to assess. Public opinion toward most 
actors was not visible, although it is fair to say that the Azerbaijani public is less 
concerned with ideological alliances and welcomes immediate assistance from wherever 
it arrives. One democratic aspect of foreign policy decisions is seen in that all the 
contracts and agreements that were signed had to pass through Parliament for 
ratification, signaling some kind of democratic venture took place in Azerbaijan last 
year.
But while several agreements were ratified by Parliament, many were not 
implemented. To make matters worse, several of the agreements were rescinded under 
Aliyev as he claimed he (personally) needed to re-evaluate the proposals. In addition, he 
armounced that all the private contracts with foreign corporations, particularly those 
involving oil, would be assessed and reaffirmed according to the levels of support that 
the corporations' motherlands had lent to Azerbaijan. In other words, if there was no 
help to Azerbaijan coming from various nations' governments, those nations' 
corporations would get no business deal from Azerbaijan. The suggestion was meant to 
encourage nations to lend greater support to Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia, but it is
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a frivolous tactic as no nation wishes to involve itself beyond moral and mediative 
support and Aliyev should not expect assistance outside these methods, especially as it 
can not boast of mutual security guarantees. Azerbaijan could not provide a guarantee 
for other nations even if it wanted and can hardly expect any nation to ratify a security 
guarantee with a nation at war. The resistance of Aliyev to consult others or to 
objectively weigh these considerations suggest that pluralist forms of decision-making 
in Azerbaijan's foreign policy will not occur during Aliyev's tenure.
Immediately, Aliyev began to negate most of the foreign policy initiatives which 
had begun under Elchibey. It appeared at first that Azerbaijan would retain its position 
toward the CIS. This was affirmed in the summer of 1993 by the Deputy Press- 
Secretary to the President (acting President), who maintained that the CIS was regarded 
as an "amorphous organization". Aliyev soon turned the tables and began engaging in 
setting out feelers to Russia to gauge its reaction to Azerbaijan's joining the CIS. 
Ironically, opinion polls in Baku among the public and the Parliament revealed that 
under the current situation, a rapprochement with Russia was desired at the time. Part of 
this decision was inspired by the fact that Russian troops had continued to assist the 
Armenians as the Russian 7th army remained in Armenia and the Russian Defense 
Minister announced that two Russian military bases would be placed in Armenia.
This renegotiating of the Russian position was reconfirmed when the decision to 
withdraw from the ruble zone, a decision made by Parliament under Elchibey, was 
rescinded. Aliyev, then, a week before the presidential elections, attended a CIS meeting 
and signed an agreement adhering Azerbaijan to the organization. Later, the decision 
was again made to withdraw the ruble from circulation, which has helped to slow the 
quickly rising inflation rate.
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Russia immediately attempted to consolidate its position in the region by advancing 
a joint communiqué, suggesting that the Transcaucasian borders were transparent, 
Russian forces could be returned to Transcaucasia, and restoration of all transportation 
links was to begin. The communiqué was rejected on the grounds that it limited the 
nations' sovereignty, but Russia continued to dig into the region when Russian Energy 
Minister Yuri Shafranik revealed that the Russian oil company, Lukoil, would be given 
a stake in the oil deal which had been agreed upon with the Western oil consortium in 
the beginning of November 1993. The minister also suggested that the oil pipeline, 
whose route was being decided and which Turkey had been hoping to acquire, should be 
diverted to Russia using pipes which were already in existence. The Azerbaijani 
authorities confirmed the report that oil would be given to Russia and the pipeline's 
route was being reconsidered to include the possibility of sending oil through Russian 
territory to Europe and beyond, but made no comment to discredit the assertion that the 
agreement was linked to Russian contributions of forces to assist Azerbaijan in the 
Nagomo- Karabakh war. In December, the Azerbaijani administration called for the 
conditional approval of a Russian peace force in the Caucasus. Other nations, including 
Turkey, will also lend troops to the force.
Opposition members in Azerbaijan claimed that Moscow wished to destabilize the 
political situation to keep control over Azerbaijan and guarantee its interests in the 
region. It claimed that anti-Yeltsin forces managed to accomplish this destabilization by 
backing Husseinov's anti-Elchibey military offensive. Simultaneously, the Russian 
military was vacillating in its support for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The criticism by the 
opposition was hushed when the government took over the publications house less than 
a month later.
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Despite Aliyev's rapprochement with Russia, he did not dismiss relations with the 
other regional actors. Refusing an opportimity would not be characteristic of Aliyev's 
actions, said one observer, as Aliyev is too shrewd, too "pro-everybody" to alienate any 
potential clients (7). However, Turkey began to take a more cautious approach toward 
Azerbaijan. No longer considered the primary protagonist for Azerbaijani causes, 
Turkey continued to consolidate ties, as was evidenced by Turkish Prime Minister 
Ciller's meeting with Aliyev during her visit to Moscow in September 1993. However, 
Turkey remained reluctant to accept Aliyev's return to power, and the Turkish 
government clearly indicated its opposition to a unilateral Russian peace force in 
Azerbaijan.
At the same time, Turkey continued to laud the Minsk conference's inactivity. The 
conference, which had been set up in 1992 as part of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to create a framework for peaceful settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war, had been making steady headway in creating several 
agreements. The process, however, was seen to be creating a more "trusting" 
environment in which to negotiate. Turkey, pinned its hopes on the Minsk process 
although the agreement has no enforcement mechanism to guarantee compliance to the 
terms of peace.
In the meantime, Aliyev continued to maintain relations with Turkey by sending an 
envoy to Ankara to reassure the Turkish administration of its guaranteed stake in the oil 
deal and Baku's preference for the pipeline construction through Turkey. This was 
before the Russian energy minister informed the world of the new arrangements that 
were being negotiated. The envoy also told officials in Ankara that closer relations 
between Baku and Moscow and Baku and Telxran would not harm bilateral relations 
between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Aliyev himself pronounced that he had worked "night
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and day" to build a bridge between Nakliichevan and Turkey. As Nakhichevan was cut 
off from the rest of Azerbaijan due to the blockade of the region by Armenia, it was 
necessary to build these bridges with Turkey and fran, whose contiguous borders with 
Nakhichevan make them the easiest suppliers of necessary goods. Again it is possible to 
locate Aliyev's pragmatism in his actions. This was revealed in his latest visit to Ankara 
where he lauded the country's relationship as being built on "friendship" and 
"fraternity".
In addition, Aliyev requested from Turkish President Suleyman Demirel the 
dispatch of arms, ammunition and volunteers to the Azerbaijan war front. The request 
was followed by the suggestion that Turkey's humanitarian assistance be distributed by 
government officials in Azerbaijan rather than by Turkey's relief organization, the Red 
Crescent. Ankara rejected both ideas (8).
Turkey, despite its official links with Baku, seems to be the place where most 
disenfranchised opposition members come to express their discontent. Wliile opposition 
members claim Aliyev is losing support and imprisoning his opponents, they have 
earned little response from Turkey which would suggest Turkey's willingness to 
investigate the accusations before the situation becomes apparent. Aliyev's relations 
with Turkey, while based on slight skepticism, will not worsen, as Turkey continues to 
consolidate its investments and private enterprises in the state.
It has become apparent since Aliyev took power that he values relations with Iran more 
than Turkey. This is not due to any overwhelming affection for radical Islam but due to 
the fact that Iran is rich and has lent concrete assistance in times of dire stress, despite 
Iran's simultaneous assistance to Armenia. Even when Aliyev was the chair of the 
regional Parliament in Nakhichevan in 1991, he was courting Iran in an attempt to get
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assistance for his tiny autonomous republic. Now the affair has grown and, in contrast to 
Elchibey's policy, Iran has greatly expanded its role in the country.
This expansion is reflected in the increased travel between the two nations by 
govermnent officials as well as the assistance Azerbaijan has been receiving from Iran.. 
It is also reflected by the increasing hostilities Iran has felt toward Armenia as 
Armenian forces encroach the Iranian border. In fact, Iranian newspapers have 
suggested that Armenia has crossed the figurative and literal line and that they should 
expect retribution should their actions not be halted soon. The Iranian government's 
tolerance was further weakened when Armenian forces, after having captured the towns 
of Fizuli and Dzhebrail in southeast Azerbaijan, began to loot technical and engineering 
goods which Iran had provided when construction of a dam and its electrical generation 
began in 1991. Iranian troops have agreed to protect the equipment and the area around 
the project.
In addition, thousands of Azerbaijani refugees have crowded the border between 
Iran and Azerbaijan and are attempting to cross into Iranian territory. Iran, in response 
to the growing needs of the refugee population in Azerbaijan, began building tent cities 
to accommodate 100,000 displaced persons. The Iranian Red Crescent provided the 
reftigees in the border vicinities with nearly 15,000 tents, 8,000 floor coverings, 6,000 
kilograms of nylon, over 70,000 blankets and huge amounts of other goods (4). Iran, in 
November 1993, also supplied Nakhichevan with 80,000 tons of fuel valued at $25 
million and warm clothing. It was paid for in local goods.
After Aliyev told all the oil companies interested in Azerbaijan's vast reserves that 
he would have to review the policy arrangements between the nations of the companies, 
the United States quickly sent a mission affirming U.S. support for Azerbaijan and has
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said that it sees Aliyev as attempting to institute democracy. They expressed their hope 
that he would continue the democratic process started before his tenure began. To 
further ingratiate themselves, the United States, despite the Freedom Support Act which 
prohibited direct aid from The United States to Azerbaijan, has sent humanitarian aid to 
Azerbaijan through the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees. As Azerbaijan's leader increasingly makes promises to Russia, and the oil 
contracts have remained static, it remains to be seen whether the West can extract any 
promises from the Aliyev administration. However, as Azerbaijan continues to lose 
money and does not succeed in reaching oil production targets, Aliyev or future 
administrations may opt to grant the oil deals as soon as possible to the Western 
companies, as they are prepared and capable of extracting, delivering and paying for the 
oil immediately. An assessment of the requirements for an economic tum-around in 
Azerbaijan may cause the administration to re-evaluate its methods for awarding 
contracts. The continuing policy changes may injure Azerbaijan's interests in the long 
term if it keeps breaking its negotiations at the last moment. Decision-making will 
require preliminary evaluations before promises are made. Democracy, as well, will 
better function in a thorough and cautious environment.
Finally, in the war against Armenia, Aliyev has shown little more success than his 
predecessors. Little progress has been made in resolving the war. Aliyev has rejected 
the Minsk Conference's latest proposals, claiming that they do not fully incorporate all 
of Azerbaijan's lands into Armenia's schedule for withdrawal. Armenia, which has a 
history of rejecting Minsk proposals, signed the resolution. In the meantime, Armenian 
forces have succeeded in displacing around 1.1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes 
and Armenia now controls 25 percent of Azerbaijani lands. An agreement is needed 
which will end armed hostilities and restore order. Refugees will then be able to return 
to their homes and become economically active, and Azerbaijan can begin its
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restoration and democratic experience.
Armenia has also been accused of swapping mental institution patients rather than 
hostages in a November 1993 exchange of war prisoners. Further, Armenia was also 
accused of extracting organs from Azerbaijani prisoners of war and selling them to 
Asian and African markets. This was first reported in the Hong Kong Chronicle and has 
since been discussed in the international news media (10).
On top of this, while the U.N. Security Council has passed four resolutions 
demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces and a cessation of hostilities, the United 
Nations has resolved little. Azerbaijan's requests were also poorly received in the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council's meeting in December 1993. The Azerbaijani delegation 
proposed that the Cooperation adopt a resolution declaring the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan, but the Armenian delegation effectively blocked it.
The introduction of the Armenian currency in Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that 
Armenia, which has denied direct involvement in the war, has effectively eliminated all 
Azerbaijan efforts to function in the region. In addition to that, Azerbaijani residents in 
Nagorno-Karabakh have been removed and the Armenian forces have begun a 
campaign to remove monuments and graves of Azerbaijan's predecessors in the region 
in order to cover up any claims that Azerbaijan has a right to the territory. In the face of 
these tactics, it seems impossible that a compromise can be found. Aliyev has had little 
effect on reconciling the two sides' interests.
The foreign policy of Azerbaijan has revealed some distinctly convoluted 
philosophies, and the presence of an authoritarian or a democrat as the national leader 
does not preclude the fact that little of Azerbaijan's interests can be served under the 
present state of war. Until this crisis can be overcome, Azerbaijan's policies will
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continue to flounder as no effective policy makers have been discovered, as Aliyev 
continues to assume primary responsibility for all policy without pluralistic discussion, 
and as nations manipulate the events of the war to achieve policies most favorable to 
themselves and most detrimental to Azerbaijan. The future viability of Azerbaijan's 
policy is dependent on the turn of the war's events and the immediate implementation of 
the stipulations of successfully-completed oil contracts which will bring much-needed 
revenue to the nation without harming Azerbaijani interests regionally or domestically.
Foreign policy formulation in the future will depend on coordinating domestic 
policy goals with external influences which can be used to their advantage. The interests 
of non-governmental organizations which are not directly subject to political authority, 
will play a role in policy formulation, as well, as leaders work alongside corporations 
and businesses to prevent contradictory elements from arising between public and 
private goals. Finally, mechanisms which provide feed-back to leaders about sectoral 
interests and concerns can be used to adjust policy accordingly as completed contracts 
are implemented and their results unfold.
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Chapter IV: Democracy and Economic Policy in Azerbaijan
Economic Policy Choices in Democratic Systems
Azerbaijan can follow two routes in pursuing its economic policy in a democratic 
manner. These options are divided by the titles liberal and conservative democracies. 
Liberal democracy, as derived from liberalism, has taken many shapes since various 
elements were articulated by thinkers such as de Tocqueville. The beginnings of liberal 
democracy stressed the dissolution of the aristocratic class and what Thomas Paine 
believed would be limited government in which rules were subject to popular control. 
Here, religious freedom, free speech, the abolition of slavery, and the confinement of 
government functioning to strictly political affairs all embodied Paine's liberal thought. 
Paine said that the dissolution of the aristocratic class and the positive effects of laissez- 
faire would provide a "harmony of interests" in which little govermnent intervention 
was needed. Early liberalism believed in competition and derided efforts toward 
egalitarian policies, and it received some praise from socialist strands which supported 
liberalism's advocacy for redistributing income.
Liberalism, however, changed its stripes in the late 19th century when private 
enterprise was revealing its inability to share the wealth. Liberalism took shape along 
philosopher John Stuart Mill's theory that the government should induce the moral 
regeneration of the underclasses and should repair some of the worst effects of free 
enterprise. Common welfare was seen as an area in which the government should be 
functioning if it were to represent the entire will of the people. Progressive social trends 
should become policy. When the government intervened in these areas of social and 
welfare policy, then liberty would be pursued and a collective approach to increasing 
participation in the nation's endeavors would be sought.
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Participation became a central focus in modem liberal democracies. The role of 
social groups defining the common good has expanded, providing the grounds for 
pluralism, in which interest groups compete to achieve their goals. The belief that the 
population knows just as much as the representative in what is good for the community 
has prevailed and social groupings have organized themselves to ensure their interests 
are voiced and receive responses. University of Bremen Professors Claus Offe and 
Ulrich K. Preuss summed up the role of the public in liberal democracies by saying,
"the role of actors within civil 
society, both collective and 
individual, assumes increasing 
strategic significance for the 
solution of societal problems. As 
justice is no longer something that 
can be implemented through 
legislation alone, the mle of law 
must be complemented at the micro­
level of the principled action of 
conscientious citizens (1)."
Offe and Preuss are restating that the role of the citizens in assuming their own 
future is the central goal of a democracy and the citizen, through participation and not 
merely representation, should be given primary responsibility. Distributive justice is no 
longer seen as accommodating every individual complaint and the role of law should be 
extended to bring every citizen under the umbrella of social, economic and legal reform. 
When participation is fully appreciated by the government, economic policy can be 
pursued in a manner that best provides security for each individual in the community.
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In contrast to liberal democracy comes a form of governance called conservative 
democracy. While liberal democracy rests on the belief that all members of a nation 
should be involved in the political and legislative processes and the goals of these 
processes should be to ignite mechanisms for social reform and increased welfare, 
conservative democracy associates itself with economic reform and government 
noninterference. Conservative democrats claim that government intervention, 
particularly in the economic field, should be minimal, or that government should 
provide legislation which deregulates or encourages laissez-faire competition. Both 
strands of theory rely on the individual but conservatism calls for the individual to act 
independently of the government while liberalism desires individuals to contrive 
government actions to increase personal prosperity.
Conservatism traces its historical roots as far back as liberalism, that is, to the post- 
Enlightenment period of 19th century England. During this era of Enliglitenment, the 
belief was bom that people could be liberated from the old order of society's unjust 
distribution of wealth and moral resources. However, conservatism functioned as a 
retort to the Enlightened belief that human are equal in personal abilities. Conservatives 
believed in the established institutions of government and the symbols associated with 
the greatness of the state, but also believed in limiting the role government should play 
in administering to the human condition.
In the liberal strand of thinking, people are entrusted with determining their own 
destinies while encouraging government to institute social reforms. Citizens are also 
encouraged to play an informed role in government decision-making. Conversely, from 
the conservative perspective, citizens are encouraged to fend for themselves without the 
assistance of government institutions or through institutions which encourage personal 
endeavor. Economic reform should be an individual pursuit. Government interference is
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meant to be rolled-backed in order to revive private enterprise. As far as social reform is 
concerned, conservatives believe that a hierarchical society should exist as people are 
naturally unequal and to try to equalize them is a mischievous ploy against human 
nature. Equating the masses with the distinct, talented and privileged minority will 
deprive everyone of the benefits of the toils of the talented. Allowing the minority room 
to pursue its own endeavors will allow the most ambitious and capable to rise to 
leadership to assist in creating a sound economy and a limited constructive government.
Conservatism is not an elitist interpretation of democracy. On the contrary, a central 
tenet of conservatism is rooted in the philosophy of independence and self-help. People 
are encouraged to embark on endeavors that will give them greater material comforts as 
well as intellectual stimuli. Conservatism is very much rooted in the philosophy of the 
improvement of humankind. It merely states that citizens should channel their energies 
into improving their lot rather than channeling energy into convincing the government 
to improve it for them.
In modem conservative doctrine, collectivism is seen as a path which "cramps 
individual choice and stifles initiative". A conservative democracy will allow free 
market forces to make the choices on which way society will move. The government's 
role is to simply curb inflation and keep an eye on the supply of money and the stability 
of currency. Government also should enforce the law and maintain order against 
potential social dismptions. In a final role, government should protect the citizens and 
should encourage behavior (such as free enterprise) which will make the citizen healthy 
and the nation prosperous and united.
While the two variations of democracy include all aspects of society in their 
philosophies, it is clear that they consider economics a primary factor in a nation's
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development. For a nation to develop according to democratic principles, the variants 
make clear that all eventualities can be accounted for so as to promote the strength of 
democracy in any given situation and to satisfy all tastes. The belief that the goverrunent 
can take control over the economy does not mean, however, that the government can 
exclude the public in creating fiscal instruments for controlled growth. The very notion 
behind government interaction in economic affairs suggests that the government should 
provide mechanisms to support the public in trying times, and to create avenues by 
which the public will benefit from capital accumulation. At no time does liberalism 
suggest that the government should be the only benefactor to income or should be 
rewarded for the work the public has performed. In Azerbaijan, a market-based system 
will not interfere in or limit the earning potentials of the individual and will accelerate 
the drive away from the past and bring standards by which the largest percentage of 
society can benefit on their own initiative. After a comfortable standard is reached the 
government can institute practices which will benefit the disadvantaged members of the 
community such as the disabled, indigent unemployables and orphans. Azerbaijan can 
boast of enough resources and human talent that government interference is not required 
to direct money-making activities and that its role in personal investment and financial 
expenditure can be reduced.
Opportunities and Choices
One of the strongest sources inducing Azerbaijan's economic revival is its oil 
production sector. Tlie latest oil contracts with Western oil companies reveal that three 
of Azerbaijan's main oil wells have the capacity to produce 3 billion barrels of oil. 
Beside this, Azerbaijan has barely tapped its off-shore oil reserves and has not 
completed exploration of the Caspian Sea's potential reserves. In addition, one oil well 
that was not included in the recent oil contracts has a capacity to produce another billion
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barrels.
Besides oil, Azerbaijan has several other mineral deposits as well as natural gas. 
Azerbaijan also has a rich array of temperature zones and climatic conditions which 
make possible the cultivation of a variety of agricultural products. Azerbaijan also has 
plenty of room for other industrial and commercial ventures, as it was deprived of 
developing several markets during the Soviet era.
It is clear that in Azerbaijan today there does not exist a suitable environment for 
creating sound markets. The macro-economic situation does not look good for the time 
being. It can be characterized as suffering from a decline in production, soaring 
inflation, foreign trade problems, the lowering of real wages, financial instability, few 
enterprise laws and an environmental disaster area. Despite the not so rosy picture, 
Azerbaijan has great potential. It has a well-developed infi'astructure, a highly- educated 
work force, which is reflective of the nation's 98 percent literacy rate, a diversified 
agricultural base, considerable oil reserves and a number of viable industries.
The World Bank suggests that the road to reform and a market- based economy will 
rely on prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the establishment and application of a legal 
and institutional framework for regulating markets, private sector development, an 
appropriate trade policy which will support output, the restructuring of enterprises 
through corporatization and marketization, the establishment of a social safety net and 
the immediate exploitation of the oil and agricultural sectors (2). Azerbaijan's 
competitiveness in the world market will rely on its ability to attract foreign investment 
and capital. This also requires upgrading their banking and financial methods.
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Little can be said of Mutalibov's reform process. Economically, Azerbaijan was still 
tied to the former USSR during his presidency and his inability to orient Azerbaijan 
toward external sources of trade and attract foreign investment hindered the 
development of market-based reforms.
However, by maintaining his ties to Russia, Mutalibov was able to extract allocations 
from the all-union budget totaling five percent of Azerbaijan's 1991 GNP. This caused a 
surplus of funds in Azerbaijan for that year. Also, Mutalibov, while not creating any 
legal guarantees for private enterprise can boast of the personal initiative of his 
constituents. By June 1, 1992, nearly 3,500 private enterprises had registered for 
licenses. It was under these circumstances that Elchibey began his tenure.
During Elchibey's presidential term, actual reforms started to take place, even 
though the process was a slow one. The first budget reforms in Azerbaijan were 
logically enough reforms in the tax structure. His Parliament passed a tax reform which 
created a 20 percent value-added tax (VAT). An excise tax replaced sales and turnover 
taxes, a tax on the "physical" person replaced the individual income tax. Several other 
taxes were implemented until taxes reached 43 percent of the payroll. Taxes were 
adjusted to inflation. It seemed that these taxes would have generated a lot of revenue 
for the state to redistribute but Parliament voted to create several exemptions, including 
a tax exemption for corporations. Even so, the VAT collection totaled 11 percent of 
gross domestic product in 1992.
In line with Elchibey's anti-Russian position, Azerbaijan attempted to break away from 
Russia's hold on Azerbaijan's pursuits. Trade with the former Soviet Union republics 
was halved from 1991 to 1992. Part of this was not due to any policy changes or 
maneuvering by the Azerbaijani administration at all. Interrepublic payment difficulties.
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cuts in energy links and general disarray caused a decrease in trade. The break-up of the 
Soviet Union also caused shortages in paper, wire, cardboard, foil and other industrial 
supplies. The disruption was especially detrimental to the supply of bottles and 
containers, as there are no glass works manufacturers in the republic. Despite these cuts, 
Azerbaijan's industries still import 70-80 percent of its raw materials from the former 
USSR. Azerbaijan's markets also import 60-70 percent for consumer supplies and 80-90 
percent of manufactured goods (3).
The shortages of glass are not a good sign for Azerbaijan's wine industry. Already 
struck by several problems such as a limited external market and the uprooting of 
70,000 hectares of grapes in the mid-1980s after Gorbachev instituted his anti-alcohol 
campaign, the wine industry will continue to suffer despite the government's attempts to 
increase output and attract foreign investment. The grape production has also been 
severely hindered due to recent gains of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian forces. The 
wine-producing regions in the southwest can not now be harvested.
Though Azerbaijan continues to export large amounts of fruit, vegetables and 
flowers to Russia, the agricultural industry is suffering from a decline in real value 
terms. Yields and quality are below the par of developed nations with similar physical 
features. An inappropriate economic system and farm manufacturing structures are 
diverting farmers from focusing their interests on the end product. Outdated farming 
equipment and the absence of modem technology combined with excessive 
administration has caused a loss in quantity and value of much of the harvested goods. 
The World Bank suggests that the Agricultural Ministry needs to be redefined to cater to 
a market-based economy. The ministry lacks regulatory policies on the grades and 
standards of merchandise. It also has not developed any pricing and marketing 
guidelines. Public policy is required to give the ministry a service-orientation and
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proper posture for supplying goods to the world market.
Industry, also, is lacking in several of these aspects. Azerbaijan has over 1,000 state- 
owned enterprises that are over- staffed, employing an average of 430 workers per 
enterprise.
On the positive side, Azerbaijani industry is very diverse with a portfolio that 
reveals works in metallurgy, building materials, forest products, woodworking, 
chemical products and machine construction. It also can boast of a light industry in 
textiles, carpets and leather. The state enterprises have suffered from a decline in output 
accompanied by an increasing surplus of goods. Azerbaijan production dropped 10 
percent in the first six months of 1993 and had earned 19 billion rubles less than the 
year before by June 1993. Managers participating in speculation, high inflation, frequent 
price jumps and the negative real cost of financing can be blamed for the hoarding of 
products. Reform is still needed in restricting the larger enterprises to make them 
competitive. This includes changing the legal structure, financing, staffing, technologies 
and assets of the enterprises.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union left several people and organizations vying for 
ownership rights. One of the most important reforms that the Elchibey government 
attempted was the creation of a meaningful land law and a privatization law. Elchibey's 
government had begun to pass laws regarding privatization. In January 1993, it passed a 
privatization law which gave the State Property Committee (SPC) the authority to 
transfer ownership of property. The SPC recommended to Parliament the prices and 
properties to be privatized, the order and sequence of privatization, the terms for foreign 
investment in the state properties, the methods to effect the transformations of 
properties and the use of the funds that are collected from the sales. Auctions of smaller
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state enterprises had begun under Elchibey and his administration had wanted to 
complete privatization by 1996 (4). In addition to privatizing corporations, the 
government had begun debate on housing privatization, which would allow residents to 
own the homes in which they lived free of charge. The resolution was defeated and 
homeowners were allowed to purchase the residences in which they lived. However, the 
debate signified very democratic undertakings and a concern for reasonable market 
values of property.
The purchase of housing, however, is easier said than done. The average monthly 
wage in December 1992 increased 18-fold over the previous December, while the retail 
price index increased 21.9 fold. Additionally, the amount of currency in circulation 
increased by more than two-fold while retail prices rose 15-fold (5). The government, 
facing a severe cash shortage in which to pay salaries, introduced the country's new 
currency, the manat, in August of 1992. The manat circulation had increased to more 
than 10 times the ruble circulation by 1993 and was supposed to become the only 
currency in circulation by August of 1993, but Aliyev rescinded the decision after 
assuming power and deciding to join the CIS. The finance minister had objected to the 
decision and was promptly fired in November.
Despite the currency fluctuations, the banking system was facing an extreme 
overhaul during Elchibey's tenure. The National Bank of Azerbaijan was structuring 
itself as the Central Bank and was reorganizing itself to end its preoccupation as 
bookkeeper for the republic and to establish policies to deal with inflation, interest rates 
and establishing an exchange stabilization fund. Several smaller private banks had 
opened up and were taking deposits of domestic consumer incomes. Laws had also been 
passed to establish minimum liquidity requirements.
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Although several laws in employment, privatization and foreign investment had 
been legislated, the Elchibey government had not developed a comprehensive energy 
policy. Oil deals were made on a first-come first-serve basis and no Energy or 
Petroleum Ministry existed. The state-owned oil company's status was not legislated 
and the utilities sector lacked any organization. This may have been the reason Aliyev 
chose to personally read the impending oil contracts.
Much of the population will suffer in the short term if market reforms are really to 
stick. In the first six months of 1993, the national income had dropped by 13 percent in 
comparison to the previous year. The social safety net had shrunk due to inflation from 
15 percent to 9 percent fi-om 1991 to 1992. Unemployment, which had been running at 
18 percent in mid-July, can be overcome once private enterprises are protected and in 
place. Despite unemployment figures, 6,000 vacancies were available in Baku in the 
summer of 1993, as people stalled in taking job offers, possibly waiting for the right 
opportunities to come along.
Along with Aliyev's promises of democratic initiative and nationalism, he also 
promised to continue the road to fi’ee market-enterprise. Such has not been the case. 
Firstly, Aliyev postponed the signing of the oil contracts and replaced the president of 
SOCAR. Then, he claimed that amateurs were responsible for the decline in oil 
production. Afterward, he said that oil is a state enterprise and there was no room for 
commercial interests. He later softened his tone as he signed a $7.5 billion oil deal with 
the Western consortium led by American oil company Amoco. The consortium agreed 
to pay $250 million when Parliament ratified the deal and another $250 million when 
the pipeline route is decided. Azerbaijan was expected to earn $94 billion from the deal. 
Aliyev, as previously stated, then linked the continuation of the contract with the 
relationships between companies' nation-states.
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Under Aliyev, the government instructed bread producers to design a method to 
balance the price of bread. Bread, which had been subsidized by the state, was being 
sold at a lower cost than it was being produced. Aliyev remedied this by raising the 
price of bread 800 times. He raised the price through a decree which said the previous 
subsidies were not "in the interests of the economic use of bread by the population". In 
the same breath, he decreed an increase in the price of fuel by 650 percent, and increases 
in electric power and natural gas prices for the population.
The economic situation for the public at large continued to decline under Aliyev, 
while he continued to retain the reigns of industry in his hands. To soften the blow of 
the bread increases, Aliyev raised salaries by 80 percent. Before the raise, the average 
salary in June and July had been R20,000 while the minimum consumer budget was 
averaged at R24,000-25,000. The poverty line was marked at R5,000.
The state also could not afford to pay government worker salaries as it lacked the 
available cash. To remedy the salary debt crisis, the Azeri International Bank began to 
sell U.S. dollars for 400 manats to the dollar in the end of November. The price had 
been 210 manats to the dollar a week before. The National Bank soon undertook the 
same method in order to increase its supply of manats.
As the economic situation worsened in Azerbaijan under Aliyev's tenure, he 
declared by decree in December that the administration of the foreign currency reserve 
would be handled by the republic's Cabinet of Ministers, the group chaired by the head 
of state, in other words, Aliyev. Aliyev said the measure was taken to make more 
effective use of the country's export potential and foreign currency reserves. He then 
announced that the manat would become the only currency of the nation by January 1, 
1994, reversing his earlier decision.
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During these events, the State Adviser on Economic Policy Issues announced in 
December that the budget deficit had reached R200 billion or R80 billion more than had 
been set by Parliament for 1993. The larger than planned deficit was attributed to the 
inflation rate which had not been calculated into the projected deficit. The adviser 
blamed the deficit as a whole and inflation in particular on the war with Armenia (6).
In December, the Azerbaijan Trade Union Council announced that the average 
monthly wage had reached R25,000 or just over half of the average consumer's monthly 
expenses. Inflation was registered by the council at 32 percent in October and 70 
percent in November (7). An opinion poll suggested that Azerbaijanis were more 
concerned about the war than food supplies, but as the situation worsens, discontent 
over Aliyev's war conduct is increasing.
Besides the obvious worsening of economic conditions, which started under 
Elchibey due to the war, many of the laws passed on privatization have been frozen 
under Aliyev. One informed observer says that Aliyev's jfreezing these laws may have to 
do with his fear of higher prices and growing unemployment. Tliis would suggest that 
Aliyev is concerned about public opinion. Almost certainly he realizes that people 
power does exist among the public. Entrepreneurs who claimed that Elchibey's 
appointees were asking for bribes still complain of racketeering among the police, 
bribery and corruption in the Aliyev regime.
As if Azerbaijan's problems were not enough, there exists another problem which 
all regimes have failed to remedy and which will take years to overcome. The 
environment continues to be degraded by industrial waste and neglect. In 1989, the first 
secretary of the Azerbaijan Writers' Union said that air pollution in Baku was 12 times 
higher that any other Soviet city, that morbidity levels were rising, and that the Caspian
80
Sea is receiving untreated sewage and oil sediment that is being discharged by 
petroleum industries in Baku and Sumgait. The Minister of Health at that time said an 
average 40kgs of pesticide was being used on each hectare of cotton and vegetable lands 
and an average 183kgs per hectare was being applied in grape-producing regions. 
Anemia rates for children under 14 were 2.5 times the average rate for the Soviet Union 
and 40 percent of women in Sumgait between the ages of 20 and 34 are reported sterile 
(8).
In Sumgait, petroleum products and phenols being dumped into the Caspian Sea 
were respectively 7-10 and 14-17 times higher than maximum permissible levels 
authorized by the Azerbaijan State Commission for Ecology. One in four children in 
Sumgait is bom with abnormalities and the child mortality rate exceeds the republic 
average by 20-25 percent. Damage done in the past 40 years was estimated at R35 
million in 1990 prices (9). Inflation since then has averaged 800-1,300 percent a year.
The PEA in 1989 pledged its commitment to cleaning up the environment and 
during Elchibey's term several laws were passed on protecting the environment and 
enforcing penalties against violators. The Committee for the Ecology has developed 
monitoring systems and has been updating environmental impact assessments, but the 
picture is bleak for the short term and it would be fatal to interrupt the beginning clean­
up process. A market-based economy may have a positive impact on the environment if 
prices for natural resources reflect the cost of their extraction using "clean" methods.
It appears from the previous discussion that Azerbaijan has a very clear path to 
follow if it wishes to restore its economy, provide a better life and environment for its 
citizens and increase its influence in the world market. The World Bank and IMF 
proposals will not work under a command economy. As long as Russia continues to
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liberalize, Azerbaijan too will be forced to liberalize as its economy for the time being is 
totally structurally dependent on Russia's. If reform laws can be implemented which 
give Azerbaijan stable ground on which to open its trade with other markets, it will be 
well on the road to recovery. This must be accompanied by a well-managed fiscal 
policy that coherently and systematically controls inflation through the sale of 
enterprises. Enterprises must first become competitive through restructuring and 
eliminating waste. In addition, strong and clearly-defined liberalization, ownership and 
privatization laws will allow citizen initiative in opening businesses. All of this, 
however, is preceded by the need for foreign investment as the country can not receive 
direct loans. The World Bank estimates that an immediate $50 million investment is 
necessary for technical assistance to design an effective reform program. The World 
Bank has prescribed the reforms. If these reforms are faithfully pursued, the 
International Monetary Fund will develop a loan and grant system with which to 
conduct reform. The point is, if Azerbaijan wishes to benefit from these institutions, it 
must reform, and orient economic policies toward a market-based system. Aliyev's 
recent conduct does not indicate a positive and democratically-oriented future for 
Azerbaijan's economy, as he refuses to release control by the state over most enterprises 
and limits potential earnings through this monopolization of resources.
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Chapter V: Conclusions
In Azerbaijan, several policy-management crises exist, namely political- 
institutional confusion, economic downturn and war. The Azerbaijani administrations 
have developed four mechanisms to deal with these crises, namely the replacement of 
regimes, the adoption of nominal institutional and legal instruments, the affiliation and 
alliance with foreign nations and the revamping of economic policies.
None of these mechanisms have succeeded in making use of public input. Only in 
the attempt at overthrowing President Mutalibov has public initiative been actively 
sought.
During the Mutalibov regime, we see adherence to the old political system, that of 
the one belonging to the Soviet Union. Mutalibov did little to respond to public desires, 
except the extraordinary task of allowing the government to secede from the Soviet 
Union. This task was inevitable, however, as the Soviet Union was already collapsing 
under its own weight. He was also guaranteed a future political career in the emerging 
system. In the realm of institutional restructuring, Mutalibov's Parliament continued to 
be based on a Communist structure that predated independence. Furthermore, while a 
democratic constitution was devised during his tenure, (of which we can offer him little 
credit) he was elected President in a less than democratic one-person contest. The 
refusal of the opposition to participate suggests two things. The first is that Mutalibov 
was amiable to that situation. No protest from him against the anti-democratic nature of 
the election was heard. The second assumption is that the public, and in particular the 
opposition parties, have not really learned what democracy means. Instead of 
performing a grass-roots level campaign, using methods such as door-to-door and 
telephone campaigns, much in the way the Chilean opposition did to defeat Pinochet,
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the Azerbaijani opposition merely remained silent and waited. Participation and 
mobilization of the masses are not higli priorities or necessarily understood concepts. It 
appears that mobilization must be a self-propelled phenomenon.
If this is the case, it can be assumed that political parties are not really accountable 
for the mass demonstrations that occurred to oust Mutalibov, although they may have 
lent an impetus. It was more likely the public's mass disaffection with Mutalibov's 
administration over the pace of economic reform, his softness toward the war and his 
adherence to Russia and the conservative, outdated method of governing which forced 
public reaction. The contention that political parties have little impact over mobilizing 
the masses is reaffirmed when the way in which Aliyev was restored to power is 
observed. When Elchibey was being threatened by a military overthrow, the public 
looked the other way to express their dissatisfaction at the current regime. Their inaction 
reveals the very limited understanding of democratic movements and behavior. Aliyev's 
appearance as a supporter of democratic values, portrayed in his staging a referendum 
and a "free and fair" election, merely reaffirmed his de facto assumption of power. The 
election was likely more for the international democratic community's benefit than for 
any promotion of democracy at home.
If it is assumed that the population will respond when it feels its interests are greatly 
threatened, we can suggest that there is a place in their schema for democracy. As it 
stands, however, it appears that the public places democracy secondary to welfare on 
their priority list, as they act only when their personal welfare is jeopardized. Of course, 
this is "normal". We can expect that basic needs must be met before people partake in 
higher pursuits such as philosophical expressions on the nature of politics. The only fear 
that should exist in this situation is that by allowing authoritarianism to exist in society, 
it is possible that the population's welfare will never improve, as addressing mass
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interests and redistributing the wealth is inimical to authoritarian control.
Furthermore, the institutions which favor democracy are limited in Azerbaijan. The 
latest election can be cited as evidence to this fact. After the last election, Aliyev 
promised to hold new parliamentary elections. The elections have not yet been 
conducted. Furthermore, Aliyev's replacing ministers, deciding bread prices, and 
instituting currency conversion by decree do not suggest that the Parliament is 
functioning correctly. Above and beyond this, the elimination of the opposition press 
through the placing of the publishing house under presidential control further suggests 
that democratic institutions in the country are lacking. This is compounded by the fact 
that several opposition party officials have been arrested on questionable or spurious 
charges. It will take quite an overhaul of the system to institute mechanisms associated 
with democratic society during the Aliyev regime.
Granted Azerbaijan is in a state of war, but this did not prevent the emergence of a 
free press under Elchibey, the discreet but continuous functioning of the Parliament. At 
the same time, the delegation of several committees to review and revise laws and 
create proposals for alleviating some of the major catastrophes of the Azerbaijan 
economy and ecology continued unhindered. In the June 7, 1992, elections that brought 
Elchibey to power, the Parliament was also elected, which reveals that the public was 
interested in obtaining some form of representation in the legislature. It has yet to be 
seen if Aliyev will allow the public to reaffirm or redesignate its choice of 
representatives.
The major drawback of democracy is a problem that is also familiar in Azerbaijan. 
Little evidence can be foimd to support the idea that democracy exists in the conduct of 
foreign policy. Mutalibov's alliance with Russia was obviously antithetical to the
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popular will of the time as the country had just split with the Soviet Union's republics. 
Yet Mutalibov continued to support the ties between the two emerging nations.
Elchibey, too can be questioned for his approach to foreign policy. While it was 
clear that the Azerbaijanis carry warm thoughts for their Turkish neighbor, it seems that 
many members of the population favored creating ties with Iran. Iran, which shares a 
common religion and which contains a huge Azerbaijani minority, would logically be a 
welcome ally. Although Azerbaijan is composed of a fairly secular body-politic, 
whereas Iran is led by fundamentalist forces, the two nations would seem to be likely 
friends. Yet Elchibey expressed much resentment toward Iran.
Aliyev adopted a pro-Russian position at the same time the population made a 
pragmatic decision that it needed Russia as a lever against Armenia. However, this is 
more likely coincidental than any plan by Aliyev to use pluralistic measures to adopt 
policy or to foiTnulate foreign policy according to an express consensus. It is not clear 
whether he was aware of public sentiment at the time he made the decision.
Finally, in the economic sphere, we can detect that Mutalibov was at least slightly 
considerate of the public mood in allowing the emergence of private enterprise. 
However, there is little record of policy making which confirms that he was a supporter 
of economic reform to benefit the public's interest.
Elchibey was definitely interest-oriented in creating a conscientious economic 
policy. His consultations with committees and creation of privatization, housing, civil 
service and environmental laws, none of which were created by decree, reveal an honest 
commitment to his nation. Clearly, these actions reflect the closest links to a democratic 
philosophy of which Azerbaijan can claim. The trend toward creating market reforms
86
was commendable, but the war overshadowed the progressive reforms which had been 
passed in Parliament.
By all indications, President Aliyev is not a proponent of market-based economies 
and as he aggregates and consolidates his power in the nation, Azerbaijan's growth, it 
appears, will be stunted. Abolishing subsidies, controlling the monetary policy 
initiatives, and wavering on oil policies, coupled with freezing the privatization policies 
passed during Elchibey's tenure reveal that Aliyev wishes to acquire as much control 
over the properties, resources and wealth of the state. His monopolizing control over the 
major industries and ministries suggests a backlash against the economic reforms and a 
worsening situation for the Azerbaijani public. In the meantime, he is not planning solid 
reforms with the aim of assisting the public or improving welfare.
Aliyev was the republic's dictator for 13 years. There is no reason to believe that just 
because he has said that he has changed, that he really has changed. It would be difficult 
for a perfect child of the Soviet system to reject that system, even in the light of 
glasnost.
The war, above all, continues to remain the pre-eminent crisis. Whether a peaceful 
settlement can be found will help to decide the direction of the present and future 
regimes. Numbers of soldiers have deserted their posts. Aliyev has decreed strong 
punishment for those deserters. He has also called up the drafting of men as old as fifty. 
While this is a young age in peace, in a war, the physical restrictions are obvious. The 
action reveals that the situation in Azerbaijan is desperate. All the U.N. resolutions and 
mediation in the world do not appear to be finding a solution. It is obvious that 
Azerbaijan should not give up its claim. First of all, it would signal a lack of sovereignty 
to pass over land to any nation which wants to stake a claim. Secondly, Azerbaijan has a
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legal and historical right to that region. Armenia's desire to create a "Greater Armenia", 
perhaps to make up for all the lost years of being a nation without a state, is ill- 
conceived. It can not just impose its will on other countries and expect to be rewarded. 
Other states are trying to realize their interests in Azerbaijan but they know that overt 
force is not the proper mechanism. Azerbaijan has also only acted in defense of its 
territory and that is all it can do for if it attempts to attack Armenian territory, it will 
lose its status as the injured party which it is using to gain assistance. The situation begs 
a solution, which can only be regarded as the withdrawal of Armenian troops. However, 
Armenian objections to withdrawal are proving a formidable obstacle.
In any event, the Republic of Azerbaijan needs a powerful government to cope with 
the crisis. This does not require, however, an authoritarian government. If Azerbaijanis 
value democracy, they will prevent this from occurring. Aliyev is consolidating his 
power, but he is losing popularity. Electricity is lacking, housing is limited and the 
problem is growing because of the number of refugees flooding the urban centers. 
People in Azerbaijan have begun to assess their situation and make comparisons 
between the two latest regimes. It is likely that an organized opposition like the PFA in 
1989 could win the next election. A peaceful transition could be possible if elections are 
held. This is not likely, although the issue of Parliamentary elections will be put on the 
agenda in the spring. If a new, stronger, cohesive Parliament comes to power, it could 
turn Aliyev's hand and force him to cooperate with the legislature. If not, Aliyev will 
continue to amass power.
It appears that any successful government in the future will have to be based on a 
coalition of parties and interests. If it does not cause a deadlock, a coalition will be the 
only way for a consensus and a democratic government to emerge under these very 
trying times. Azerbaijan is dominated by local clan or "mafia" organizations in which
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power is left in the hands of a few individuals. This has to be overcome through a 
power-sharing agreement. The government must direct the way by providing an 
example as well as enforcement.
Finally, if Azerbaijan is going to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, it 
will rely on the administration granting a high degree of local autonomy and self-rule. 
This plan will need decentralization as well as economic and political freedom to occur. 
Decentralization and economic and political freedom are democratic by nature. This 
would suggest that a solution to the war could also become a solution to the many other 
crises which exist in Azerbaijan. For now, however, the presidents and the public in 
Azerbaijan are willing to resort to nondemocratic methods to achieve their goals. This 
can easily provide the opportunity for a return to institutionalized authoritarianism, but 
can be avoided by a concerted effort to increase individual respect for democracy's 
principles. Democracy can also be encouraged through the granting of greater freedoms 
to the individual and enhanced communication and organization among several 
competing but conciliatory actors.
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